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Abstract
Nina S. Russell: Moving the needle:
How price and quality transparency could lower costs and improve quality
in United States hospitals
This thesis shows the limitations of price and quality information for
improving the value of healthcare.1 First, in four survey experiments to determine
the impact of information on decision-making, consumers were more likely to
choose the lower cost or higher quality option when relevant information was
presented in straightforward ways with a minimized risk of information overload (n
= 224, t = -3.7065, p < 0.0002). Second, hospitals on the U.S. News Best Hospital
list between 2008 and 2011 were shown to be significantly more likely to be found in
wealthy, highly populated areas, while unranked hospitals were more likely to be the
sole community provider. Third, perceived quality (U.S. News-ranked hospitals) was
shown to be out of alignment with actual quality (hospitals performing above the
national average for readmission and mortality according to Medicare Hospital
Compare): 36 hospitals performed well on both lists, constituting only 0.77% of total
hospitals in the U.S. in 2011.
Current efforts have not gone far enough toward complete transparency to
lead to negative effects such as collusion, nor to positive effects such as better value.
Fears held by economists and private sector participants will likely not be realized in
the near future—but neither will the hopes of policymakers for demand-driven
change in the healthcare system.

1

In this context, “value” denotes the relationship of price to quality, where a high quality to cost ratio
is of good value.

1

Chapter 1 Introduction to transparency
Chapter 1 begins by outlining problems in the United States healthcare
market—namely, high costs and low quality. Next, it presents the case for
transparency as a demand-side and supply-side solution to these problems. Finally, it
highlights the main risks of transparency, such as the threat of collusion leading to
higher prices across the board.
Healthcare in the U.S. is too costly. U.S. healthcare spending in 2010 was
17.7 percent of GDP (Bank, 2015). Such high spending may not seem unreasonable
until we compare the U.S. to its peer countries. In 2010, the OECD average for
healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP was 9.5 percent (Lafortune, 2012). One
might hope that, because the U.S. is spending more than its peers, what it is receiving
is worth the premium price.
To the contrary, healthcare quality in the U.S. does not appear to merit the
cost. Among 19 countries included in a 2008 study of amenable mortality, the United
States had the highest rate of deaths from conditions that could have been prevented
or treated successfully (Nolte & McKee, 2008). Americans receive appropriate,
evidence-based care when they need it only 55 percent of the time (NCQA, 2007).
Tens of thousands of Americans die each year as a result of preventable hospital
errors (NCQA, 2007). Furthermore, too much is currently being spent on the wrong
types of care. Adult patients in the U.S. receive only about half of the care
recommended for their condition, yet nearly 30 percent of the care delivered each
year is for services that may not improve patient health (RWJF, 2015).
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It is clear that we ought to combat the trend of the U.S. spending too much
and getting too little, for ethical reasons (people’s lives are at stake) and for economic
ones (this is an inefficient market). The U.S. healthcare market is rife with
misallocated resources that could be fixed by a realignment of incentives to prioritize
value over volume.
Price and quality transparency could be the answer. First, transparency could
cause providers to improve their own performance relative to benchmarking for
price and quality. Second, transparency could lead to competition on the basis of
price and quality, thereby driving positive change throughout the market. Finally,
transparency could provide consumers with the information necessary to choose
low-cost, high-quality options, thereby channeling clientele and revenue toward
hospitals that are providing better value.
Transparency relies upon the Internet’s ability to communicate large amounts
of up-to-date information in ways that are tailored to the end user. Just as consumers
evaluate restaurants on Yelp, so, too, can patients now post a review of their
physician on Healthgrades.
Transparency in healthcare pricing and quality is popular with policymakers
partly due to the persuasiveness of philosophical and economic arguments for
patients to have full information. From a philosophical standpoint, to enable
consumers to have full information is laudable in the context of individual
autonomy. From an economic standpoint, transparency seems poised to enable an
efficient healthcare market: with more information available, consumers, providers,
and payers can make better decisions, enabling both supply-side and demand-side
change. In a market struggling under the excess costs incurred by supply-sensitive
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care—which accounts for more than half of all Medicare spending2—transparency
could provide consumers with the information they need to use the “just right”
amount of healthcare, thereby reducing costs.
However, varying philosophical conceptions of patients and competing
economic interests mean that legislation can result in the assembly of information
that is designed for policymakers rather than consumers.3 Providing policymakers
with more information can be valuable for improving public health policy4 and
facilitating supply-side change. An example of a supply-side attempt to mitigate rising
healthcare costs in the U.S. is the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS)
Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program. In October 2014, CMS began
cutting Medicare payments for hospitals that perform poorly with respect to
hospital-acquired conditions (Medicare, 2015b). However, supply-side policies are
ought not be implemented instead of demand-side ones merely because private
payers and providers are afraid of airing their dirty laundry.

2

According to the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, “Supply-sensitive care refers to services where
the supply of a specific resource has a major influence on utilization rates. The frequency of use of
supply-sensitive care is not determined by well-articulated medical theory, much less by scientific
evidence; rather, it is largely due to differences in local capacity, and a payment system that ensures
that existing capacity remains fully deployed. Simply put, in regions where there are more hospital
beds per capita, patients will be more likely to be admitted to the hospital. In regions where there are
more intensive care unit beds, more patients will be cared for in the ICU. More specialists will result
in more visits to specialists. And the more CT scanners are available, the more CT scans patients will
receive” (T. D. A. o. H. Care, 2015).
3 In an analysis of 174 pieces of legislation passed in 45 states between 1956 and 2013, 107 out of
explicitly required the reporting of price information to the general public (often through the state
government), while 120 required the reporting of information solely to the state government. The
remainder imposed requirements on payers and providers to make information available on their own
(sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine).
4 Policymakers can use data on overall pricing to regulate prices directly or to pursue alternate
methods of increasing the degree of price competition. In his 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, Paul B. Ginsburg describes the three distinct audiences that have the potential
to benefit from healthcare price information. Besides indicating the role of policymakers in regulating
competition and prices, he also highlights the audiences of (1) individual patients and (2) employers
purchasing health benefits for their employees (Finance, 2013).
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One defense of transparency is a values-based argument holding that
transparency is a core value of our society. On this view, we believe that the public
or individual consumers should know about the products and services they are
buying and what they cost, even if someone else is paying (i.e., an insurer, Medicare,
or Medicaid). While this perspective is valuable, this paper focuses on concrete policy
implications of transparency, specifically relating to its feasibility.
Another supporting argument for transparency is utilitarian: we ought to use
transparency to promote high-value healthcare. I have already referred to the three
mechanisms by which this might take place: providers improving their own
performance due to benchmarking; competition on the basis of price and quality;
and consumers choosing low-cost, high-quality options.
Yet, there are risks to implementing transparency. The healthcare market in
the U.S. is far from perfectly competitive, with economies of scale for payers and
providers. As a result, it is possible that publication of prices may allow firms to
reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition, as occurred in Denmark’s readymixed concrete market when the Danish antitrust authority published firm-specific
transaction prices in 1993 (Overgaard, Møllgaard, & Albæk, 1997). Whereas firms
had been cutting deals before the legislation, in 1993 they saw an opportunity to hike
up prices, which led to convergence at a higher price point (Overgaard et al., 1997).
The risk of price inflation means that healthcare consumers could end up worse off
than before transparency legislation.
Transparency also poses risks to quality. If the measures for quality are not
chosen properly, we may see negative consequences for the quality of care and
adverse effects on health worker motivation and performance. Stimulation of certain
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efforts by public reporting may discourage efforts on aspects of healthcare
performance that are not measured (de Bruin, Baan, & Struijs, 2011). Further risks to
quality include the possibility of false reporting; providers cherry-picking patients to
meet targets more easily; increased inequity due to the rewarding of providers and
facilities that are in a better position to meet targets; and dilution of intrinsic
motivation (Ireland, Paul, & Dujardin, 2011). While these are valid concerns, they
could be reduced by careful selection of performance measures. For example, the
risk of healthcare workers “treating to the test” (focusing on aspects of health that
are being measured) seems possible to mitigate by ensuring that the “test” includes
every aspect of health that we care about.
Furthermore, a broader risk that faces all policy decisions is the chance that
the amount spent implementing price and quality transparency will not be made up
for in lower prices and higher quality. Measuring and reporting takes resources, on
the part of providers, payers, and the government, and overregulation can stifle the
private sector. For example, in its June 18, 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance, the American Hospital Association writes:
Nationally, hospitals deal with more than 1,300 insurers, each having
different plans, all with multiple and often unique requirements for
hospital bills. Add to that decades of governmental regulations that
have made a complex billing system even more complex and
frustrating for everyone involved. In fact, Medicare rules and
regulations alone top more than 130,000 pages, much of which is
devoted to submitting bills for payment. Clearly, this is an
unworkable system. (Finance, 2013)
Transparency runs the risk of piling on more paperwork without realizing returns.
Given these concerns, this thesis addresses the feasibility of implementing
transparency, given current efforts. It seeks to understand how healthcare reform
efforts could best raise quality and lower costs. In Chapter 2, I lay out a theory of
6

transparency, arguing that we ought to understand the behavior of healthcare
consumers through the lens of bounded rationality. Chapters 3 and 4 present the
current state of affairs for price and quality transparency (respectively) in the U.S.
hospital market. The literature includes a lack of conclusive evidence that
transparency drives change in hospital price and quality. The case studies of
legislation confirm that members of both parties have pushed for transparency, but
also highlight the ways in which current legislation does not go far enough. I propose
that current efforts have fallen short of achieving their aims because they were
constructed for a hypothetical fully rational consumer, rather than one that is
boundedly rational.
Chapter 5 presents the results of four surveys and of an analysis of the U.S.
News Best Hospital rankings for the years 2001-2014. The survey results indicate
that information presentation matters, and that healthcare quality and price data can
be confusing to the point where people can draw opposite conclusions from the
same data. The survey results also indicate that U.S. News Best Hospitals tailors
information to consumers such that they are more likely to make the right decision.
Analysis of the U.S. News Best Hospital rankings shows hospitals ranked between
2008 and 2011 were shown to be significantly more likely to be found in wealthy,
highly populated areas, while unranked hospitals were more likely to be the sole
community provider. It also suggests that perceived quality (U.S. News-ranked
hospitals) is out of alignment with actual quality (hospitals performing above the
national average for readmission and mortality according to Medicare Hospital
Compare).

7

From each of these components of analysis emerges a view of price and
quality transparency as being a potentially useful but complex policy tool, not a silver
bullet. Having provided an introduction to transparency, I next lay out conditions for
its success.

8

Chapter 2 Theoretical underpinnings of transparency

Imagine that you live in Boston and are trying to decide where to have knee
replacement performed. You are insured and your deductible is $1,000. You pull up
search results on My Health Care Options, a website run by the Massachusetts
Health Care Quality and Cost Council. Both hospitals have low rates of surgical site
infections. Beth Israel Deaconess has treated 275 cases, of which 11% were complex;
Massachusetts General has treated 624 cases, of which 6% were complex. Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center has a cost that is no different from the median state cost,
while Massachusetts General Hospital has a cost above the median state cost for this
procedure. The data provided on the website is from 2008 and 2009, and you are
making your decision in April 2015.
In short, you are faced with a large amount of information, all of which is so
dated that it is likely no longer relevant. It is difficult to infer what the best option
for your own treatment will be.
***
The behavior of healthcare consumers, providers, and payers determines
whether price and quality transparency will drive improvements in the value of
healthcare. The emphasis of this chapter is on finding a theory of the healthcare
consumer that aligns with reality. Only then can we properly evaluate the potential of
price and quality transparency initiatives to drive positive change in the U.S.
healthcare industry through benchmarking, competition, or consumer selection,
which is the aim of Chapters 3 and 4.

9

In this chapter, I evaluate the view that consumers, providers, and payers are
capable of making better decisions when presented with full information. I focus
first on healthcare consumers, then widen my scope to include healthcare providers
and payers. This connection is possible because just as patients care about their
health while also having other aims such as financial solvency, the business model of
healthcare providers depends on providing quality care while also performing
enough procedures to bring in revenue.
To determine which model of behavior is most useful here, I expand upon
the three arguments presented briefly in the introduction: benchmarking,
competition, and consumer choice. Underlying all three arguments is the economic
theory that full information is necessary for markets to function efficiently. An
efficient market allows prices to direct resources toward those who value them most.
In the context of healthcare, optimal resource allocation would be achieved by
consumers making informed decisions, choosing the price and quality combination
that will maximize their own utility.
The first two arguments describe supply-side change; the third focuses on
demand. Benchmarking could cause improvements even if we just increase the
information that providers have about themselves and their competitors, without the
competitors being identifiable and without the information being made publicly
available. The second argument differs from the first in that it requires some public
availability of information in order for competition on price and quality to occur.
The third argument describes demand-side change. For the third argument to
hold up, reforms that focus on increasing transparency should be accompanied by
measures for strengthening citizens’ capacity to act upon the available information
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(Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). In the context of the U.S. hospital market, this means
that factors introducing stickiness, such as in-network providers for those covered by
insurance, should not be underestimated in their power to limit the impact of
transparency on bringing about meaningful change.
To lay the groundwork for evaluating these stances, I present two dominant
theories of patient behavior, each of which has different implications for
transparency in healthcare. I evaluate them based on their ability to explain the
apparent paradox currently observed in the U.S. healthcare market. The paradox is
that Americans bear the burden of expensive, low-quality care, yet do not actively
select for cheaper, high-quality care. I argue that, given more active regulator
promotion of transparency, consumers would be able to make better healthcare
decisions.
Through health insurance and the threat of malpractice suits, much of the
U.S. population does not bear the full brunt of consuming overpriced, low-quality
healthcare. Despite these protections, 57.1% of all personal bankruptcies in the US
in 2014 were explicitly tied to medical bills (LaMontagne, 2014). As states resist
expanding Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act and insurers rely upon marketbased tools such as deductibles, medical bankruptcy will continue to be an issue in
coming years, even though one aim of ACA was to address its prevalence by
expanding insurance coverage (Sugden, 2012). Consuming low-quality healthcare
also brings risks—as of 2000, medical negligence was the third leading cause of death
in the US, behind heart disease and cancer (Starfield, 2000).
Despite significant consequences of uninformed consumption of healthcare,
evidence suggests that healthcare consumers do not spend much time determining
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the price and the quality of their healthcare options. But for the most part it is not
because they do not want to—it is because they cannot. In a Kaiser Family
Foundation phone survey of 1,517 respondents, 64 percent stated that it is difficult
to find information comparing the cost of different treatments and procedures
offered by different doctors and hospitals. The survey also shows that between 1996
and 2008, the percentage of Americans using comparison quality information on
doctors grew from four percent to a somewhat-less-paltry six percent (KFF, 2008). I
will address here the implications of a market in which consumers have trouble
acquiring price information and appear largely uninterested in quality data. My task
here is not to place value judgments upon any of these facts or behaviors, but rather
to determine which theory best explains these phenomena.
2.1 Theory of full economic rationality
Let us start by assuming that consumers act with full economic rationality. A
consumer can have multiple possible ends—e.g., benefitting society, benefitting
oneself—and rational choice only specifies the means by which she goes about
achieving these ends. In the context of price and quality transparency, self-interested
rationality means that consumers will choose the best value healthcare from a range
of options, given all available information. (The competing theory, presented in the next
section, differs on this last point of “all available information.”)
The theory of self-interested rationality in healthcare consumption aligns
with intuitions about human motivation. Freedom from injury and severe illness is a
good on which most people place a high value. Transparency ties a patient-centric
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approach to the market, ostensibly granting consumers agency in their healthcare
decisions.
When policies are based on the assumption of full rationality, they can take
the form of forcing consumers to bear a large portion of the burden when things go
wrong. The rationale is that, if people care about themselves first and foremost, they
will make better decisions if they face the consequences of whatever they decide.
According to this line of reasoning, a price transparency initiative built on this
approach might, for instance, show consumers that several preventative care
measures (e.g., regular check-ups, using an inhaler) add up to be much less costly in
the long run than a hospital visit resulting from lax preventative behavior. In that
way, such an initiative could incentivize consumers to behave in a way that is better
for their health and for their wallets.
But with full economic rationality, the consumer can also exercise the
capacity to make decisions based on the bigger picture, weighing costs and benefits
as they will have an impact not just on the consumer, but also on her family, friends,
and the rest of the world, insofar as they are part of her utility function. We can
imagine a system where the state takes the role of social planner, by imposing
penalties and rewards for self-destructive behavior. Yet, once we realize that people
take other interests besides their own into account, we are able to pass along some of
the “social planner” capacity to the individual agents. The role of policy, then, is to
provide information in the format best suited to enabling consumers to weigh their
decisions. For example, price transparency could be designed to show an eighty-yearold man the cost of his third bypass surgery, and allow him to see the number of
prenatal visits for low-income mothers the same amount of money could have
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funded. Such information could lead him to change his behavior, or it might not, but
either way he would be more informed.
Full economic rationality allows for people to refrain from expensive
treatment to ease the burden on their families, or to prefer suboptimal health to
being a financial burden on relatives or friends. But full economic rationality does
not necessarily entail sacrificing one’s health. It just calls for a weighing of the
options, and could lead to refraining from expensive treatment in order to leave
funds untouched for one’s child to go to college. Alternately, it could lead to
investing in the expensive treatment in the hopes that the child will have a better
childhood with a living father.
2.2 Limitations of full economic rationality
Everyone has values and preferences that inform the decisions they make.
Assuming full economic rationality, an agent will place appropriate value on her
health, depending on her preferences. The value a healthcare consumer places on his
own health determines how much time he will invest in gathering information about
his options. To place near-infinite value on said freedom leads a terminal patient to
spend resources on hopeless treatments because the treatments have some chance—
however slim—of benefiting him. In contrast, an agent with different priorities
might identify that the same resources might bring about more benefit overall if
saved for one’s heirs, or used for palliative care (which might indeed actually be in
one’s self-interest, depending on one’s preferences). If a person places an infinite
value on her freedom from injury, the best thing she can do is pursue as much
available information as possible. But, if she has additional aims besides freedom
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from injury, then she will stop seeking information at the point at which accurate
information is unavailable.
Rational choice theory assumes complete, transitive preferences, defined over
known, fixed outcomes, with decision makers maximizing their utility by choosing
the option that yields the highest level of benefits, discounted by costs (Jones, 1999).
But to meet all of these conditions, especially that of known and fixed outcomes,
does not seem quite plausible in the context of healthcare. The subjective expectedutility variant of rational choice theory associates a probability distribution, estimated
by the decision-maker, with outcomes, thereby integrating risk and uncertainty
(Jones, 1999). The subjective expected-utility variant accounts for the uncertainty
inherent to healthcare and allows for people to opt for choices benefitting others in
addition to or instead of themselves. However, it still does not explain a person who
must make a rushed decision about whether to have an emergency procedure, and
does not have time to calculate risks. It is difficult to calculate probabilities perfectly
in most of these cases, but price and quality transparency can fill in some areas of
uncertainty.
2.3 Theory of bounded rationality
Let us now turn to the second theory, which is a revision of the first. The
second theory holds that patients act with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is
the same as full economic rationality, but with stipulations about process to explain
why people sometimes make decisions with sub-optimal outcomes. These
assumptions about process are that the rationality of individuals is limited by three
factors: (1) the information they have, (2) the cognitive limitations of their minds,
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and (3) the finite time they have to make a decision (Jones, 1999). Price and quality
transparency have the potential to mitigate the first and third factors: by providing
relevant information for different circumstances, such as the average cost and
mortality for heart attack patients at a certain hospital, transparency can enable a
quick, well-informed decision.
Figure 1: Bounded rationality and full rationality (conceptual diagram)

As Figure 1 shows, bounded rationality can lead to a suboptimal decision. In
contrast, full rationality avoids the limitations of imperfect information, time and
cost constraints, and cognitive limitations, leading to a better decision. Yet, a theory
of bounded rationality is useful in the context of healthcare because it accommodates
the limited information available in healthcare and the implausibility of patients being
able to devote the entirety of their mental energy to these decisions. If patients
behave according to bounded rationality, then we ought to construct transparency
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policies very differently than if we were to posit fully economic rationality.
Specifically, an assumption of bounded rationality may lead us to discount the
expected benefits of price and quality transparency initiatives.
Let us consider a patient who is choosing between multiple cancer
treatments. She may categorize them as high, medium, and low risk, then make a
decision based on how much risk she willing to accept. The danger with this
technique is that it may be more useful to categorize cancer treatment options based
on efficacy, and she is making a sub-optimal decision in terms of utility maximization
by choosing based on risk instead. Properly presented quality information could
guide her toward the optimal decision.
Now let us say that she is simply unable choose whether to have chemo or
surgery—let us say these are the only treatment options available—and so she does
nothing. In the meantime, the cancer metastasizes. The problem with this, from a
policymaker’s perspective, is that the making of a decision—any decision—would
have been better. Cognitive overload and processing constraints can lead to
consumers deferring choice, even if the status quo is less desirable than any of the
options (Schlesinger, 2010). Adjusting the parameters of decisions can encourage
optimal outcomes by making the right choice easy.
Finally, patients may make choices by selectively evaluating events and
circumstances to improve perceived self-efficacy (Schlesinger, 2010). Patients may
make sub-optimal decisions (like self-operation) if they use certain emotional
heuristics and filters. It would be better to eliminate the need for heuristics in this
context, to enable optimal outcomes.
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2.4 Implications of bounded rationality
The previous sections have proposed that price and quality transparency
policies would be most effective if based on the assumption of bounded rationality. I
now show how this could play out for healthcare consumers, providers, and payers.
2.4.1 For healthcare consumers
Viewing patient choice through the lens of bounded rationality can help us
create better policies than understanding patient choice through full economic
rationality. But what do considerations about bounded rationality mean in practice?
First, to reduce the risk of patients categorizing choices in ways that highlight the
wrong elements of options, policymakers can take the extra step to reduce the
cognitive burden of choice by categorizing choices based on the most important
characteristics. They could consult with experts to determine the most important
characteristics. The question remains of who would be best positioned to do this.
Doctors seem to be the clear choice, given variation among cases, but they might
lack the time to present choices like this.
A second implication of bounded rationality in crafting transparency policy is
that, to minimize the danger of patients making sub-optimal decisions through use of
emotional heuristics and filters, policymakers can reduce the need for emotional
heuristics and filters by instilling trust in the system through transparency about price
and quality. For instance, if a healthcare consumer is tempted to self-operate because
she does not trust the medical professional’s expertise, she could then read the
statistics on the physician’s quality, and on the risks and potential complications of
the recommended procedure.
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Finally, to avoid cognitive overload and processing constraints, policymakers
can tailor information to individuals’ specific concerns. An exemplary instance of
information tailoring is the healthcare cost comparison website for Maine, which
provides a reasonable amount of relevant information based on the needs of
individual consumers. The website assesses consumer needs through the inputting of
search terms. For instance, if I tell the website that I am a new patient with low to
moderate problems who wants to know how much an office visit will cost, the
website will provide me with the statewide average cost and then the cost for each
hospital in the state.
In contrast, an example of an ineffective approach would be a spreadsheet
with all the information behind the scenes for the website. This approach could be
based on an assumption of full economic rationality, with a consumer presumed to
be able to consume whatever amount of information is appropriate to make a
decision. It could also be based on an assumption of self-interest, with patients
placing near-infinite value on their own freedom from severe injury and illness and
thereby consuming as much information as possible. Given bounded rationality, we
understand that providing consumers with the right amount of relevant information
enables them to process it, given their available time and mental energy. To do so
perfectly would, in an ideal world, involve making the raw data available for
economists and researchers who want it all, in addition to the consumer-friendly
versions.
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2.4.2 For healthcare providers
When considering how price and quality transparency will play out, we must
consider the potential responses of all market players. In this section, I present the
implications of boundedly rational healthcare providers.
In its current form, the system allows for some degree of gaming. For
instance, it is in the interest of hospitals to devote resources to getting out the vote
whenever rankings season comes around. Two emails sent to all staff and faculty in
the Mount Sinai Health System indicate that the administration is consistently
involved in getting out the vote for U.S. News Best Hospitals survey responses (see
Appendix for full emails). Indicative quotes are:
We appreciate your assistance in ensuring that the Mount Sinai
Health System is fully represented in the nomination process. (Davis
and Charney, 2014)
Thank you for your continued commitment to advancing both the
outstanding patient care of the Mount Sinai Health System, and the
innovative education provided by the Icahn School of Medicine at
Mount Sinai. (Davis and Charney, 2015)
If the U.S. healthcare market had full information, those resources could be devoted
to more useful ends, such as patient care. Furthermore, some hospital systems have
more resources to devote to getting out the vote than others.
The complexity of the U.S. healthcare market also means that for some
providers, it is optimal for them to remove themselves from the system. For
instance, Dr. Michael Ciampi, a primary care physician based in Maine, converted his
practice to a no-insurance model in April 2013 (Woodruff, 2013). His argument? “I
work for patients. I don’t work for the government and I don’t work for insurance
companies.” Since the switch, he has lowered his prices due to savings on overhead,
but has also lost hundreds of his initial 2,000 patients (Woodruff, 2013). Bounded
20

rationality accounts for this outcome by attributing Dr. Ciampi’s decision to his
limited energies and time. Furthermore, Dr. Ciampi is not alone, although psychiatry
remains the number one specialty where doctors do not participate in health
insurance plans. For those opting out, not participating in insurance means that they
(1) can charge more, (2) do not have to spend time on the paperwork for insurance,
and (3) have the freedom to provide better care by spending more time with patients
(Miller, 2014; Sullivan, 2012). Groups have developed around this, such as the
American Academy of Private Physicians (Physicians, 2015), and the number of
doctors practicing private medicine has passed 5,000 (Wieczner, 2013).

2.4.3 For healthcare payers
We need to be wary of overregulating the private sector. A 2012 survey sent
to 630,000 physicians (84 percent of all physicians in active patient care) with 13,575
respondents revealed that physicians spend over 22 percent of their time on nonclinical paperwork; that over 52 percent of physicians have limited the access
Medicare patients have to their practices or are planning to do so; that over 26
percent of physicians have closed their practices to Medicaid patients; and that 7
percent plan to switch to cash-only or concierge practices (Hawkins, 2012).
While these findings speak more immediately to the private practice
community than to hospitals, they have serious implications for healthcare payers. If
insurers are being cut out because providers are sick of jumping through hoops to
work with them, then it is in the interest of boundedly rational healthcare payers to
resist transparency efforts.
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2.5 Chapter conclusion
The success or failure of price and quality transparency hinges upon the
extent to which policies take into account the boundedly rational behavior of
healthcare consumers, providers, and payers. My argument rests upon a normative
claim that policies are preferable if they result in consumers making optimal
decisions. If bounded rational choice theory describes patient behavior, then the
main concern of the healthcare system should be whether healthcare consumers are
provided the appropriate amount of relevant information. Likewise, if bounded
rationality accurately describes provider and payer behavior, then transparency
policies should be designed to place a minimal burden on providers and payers while
incentivizing price and quality improvements.
Having laid out the theoretical basis for transparency and presented a model
the behavior of healthcare market participants, the rest of this paper seeks to
demonstrate that bounded rationality indeed fits empirically with the ways in which
price and quality transparency currently functions in the U.S.
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Chapter 3 Implementing price transparency
Most people aren’t interested in irrelevant hospital charge-masters, or the
details of health plan negotiations. They simply want to know what they’ll
be paying themselves at the end of the day.
(Statement of Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, Finance, 2013)

Hospital charges can be staggering. Daniel Diaz was billed $3,355.96 for five stitches
on his finger after cutting himself while peeling an avocado; a dab of skin glue on Orla
Duffy’s forehead laceration ran up a $1,696 bill (Rosenthal, 2013). This disproportionality
can also be seen with medications: at California Pacific Medical Center, a Tylenol with
codeine pill (market price: $0.50) costs $36.78 (Rosenthal, 2013). One cannot help but
wonder—why not just send your friend over to Wal-Mart or CVS to pick up some Tylenol
instead?
Indeed, Wal-Mart entered the primary care market on April 18, 2014 with a medical
clinic in Copperas Cove, Texas (Canales, 2014). It brought to the table a clear value
proposition: come to us for a $40 appointment, and that $40 will buy you wellness and
preventative care, primary acute care, and referrals to specialists (Wal-Mart, 2015). (For those
covered by Wal-Mart’s employee health plan, that visit will cost only $4 (Flessner, 2014).)
Prior to going in for a lab test or immunization, you can look up the price online–$3 for a
blood sugar test, 25 for a flu vaccine (Wal-Mart, 2015).
These examples highlight the disjunction between what makes sense to consumers
and what the healthcare industry is currently doing. They speak to the complex interaction of
the public and private sectors in the U.S. healthcare market, which this chapter addresses in
the context of price transparency.
***
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Building on the foundation laid in Chapter 2, let us now evaluate price transparency
initiatives. This chapter examines barriers to transparency and uses lessons from case studies
to develop an understanding of price and quality transparency policy. It shows that, of seven
federal price transparency bills sponsored between 2007 and 2013, 61 percent of sponsors
were Republicans.5 Yet, of 174 pieces of price transparency legislation passed in 45 states
between 1956 and 2013, 60.47 percent passed when state legislatures were a majority
Democrats (t = 2.827; p = 0.005) (sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a;
analysis mine). This chapter also puts forth criteria for the selection and evaluation of
exemplary price transparency initiatives, such as evaluating the user-friendliness of a state’s
website by determining whether it allows the user to compare specific hospitals.
3.1 Existing work on price transparency
To discuss price transparency, it is necessary to first define key concepts relating to
price information in the context of healthcare. (See Appendix for examples.) First, the
chargemaster is a list of a hospital’s prices for every procedure performed in the hospital and
every supply item used during those procedures (Reinhardt, 2006). These procedures
correspond roughly to the groupings of Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-DRGs),
which are a Medicare coding for their payment system. MS-DRGs classify each hospital case
into one of 999 groups that is published in the Federal Register (CMS, 2013a; "Code of
Colorado Regulations: Annual health reporting and data retention requirements," 2010). Any
given MS-DRG is tied to a reimbursement rate. The reimbursement rate is the amount, by MSDRG code, that a carrier paid for a procedure at a facility or hospital, plus any expected
5

These seven bills—H.R. 2853 (2013), H.R. 1326 (2013), H.R. 5800 (2012), H.R. 4803 (2010), H.R. 2249
(2009), H.R. 2566 (2009), and S. 2221 (2007)—were found through using the terms “price,” “transparency,”
and “healthcare” to search ProQuest Congressional Publications. To increase the timeliness of the findings, the
search results were limited to the year 2007 onward.
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deductible, copayment, or coinsurance ("Code of Colorado Regulations: Annual health
reporting and data retention requirements," 2010).
Each of these concepts has different implications for consumer decision-making.
For example, reimbursement rates often differ significantly from hospital charges. A
consumer covered by health insurance may not care about either, and be only interested in
his or her co-pay. For a consumer who is not covered by health insurance or who is in a
high-deductible plan, he or she may be responsible for the full chargemaster rate. However,
depending on state and hospital policies, the patient may receive the care for free, or may
only need to pay an amount close to the actual reimbursement rate being paid by insurance
companies, Medicare, and Medicaid.
It seems clear that the more specific information is, the more useful it is to the
patient—within reason. For example, it is more useful for a consumer to have quality
information tied directly to a given illness or procedure at a hospital (i.e., DRG or
chargemaster category) than to have overall hospital quality information. But it may be
overwhelming for him to be provided with twenty-five indicators of a hospital’s quality for
cardiac bypass surgery, rather than the five most important measures.
Furthermore, one must determine whether the information presented will drive
improvements, either through benchmarking, competition, or consumer choice. I now turn
to the empirical literature on the consequences of price transparency for healthcare provider
performance, which is still relatively limited, in part because price transparency efforts are
relatively new (Sinaiko & Rosenthal, 2011).
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3.1.1 Limited effects of price transparency on price variation
New Hampshire provides a test case of price transparency failing to contain costs. In
2007, New Hampshire launched HealthCost, a website listing prices for medical procedures.
The New Hampshire Insurance Department (NHID) conducted a study in June 2009 on
price variation for medical procedures. The NHID analyzed claims data for HealthCost
procedures, using timeframes before and after the website’s release (NHID, 2009). The
study broke down HealthCost procedures into average allowed amount paid, the coefficient
of variation, the median allowed amount, and the percent increase for each year analyzed
(NHID, 2009). It demonstrated that there had been no change in price variation as a result
of greater transparency (NHID, 2009). Instead, prices increased within similar ranges as in
prior years (NHID, 2009). The NHID did not perform significance testing because price
variation clearly did not decrease during the relevant time period (NHID, 2009). Overall, the
study showed that price transparency failed to contain costs in New Hampshire from 2007
to 2009.
But looking over a longer time frame did not improve the findings from New
Hampshire. A follow-up 2014 report on New Hampshire’s HealthCost program was based
on interviews with healthcare stakeholders and experts, focusing on the steps taken in New
Hampshire and how they have affected healthcare markets across the state (Tu &
Gourevitch, 2014). Its focus was qualitative, highlighting developments such as hospitalsponsored price transparency, hospital renegotiation of lower contract rates, and priceshopping tools with incentives (Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). Although it did not measure price
variation, it did claim that consumer usage had remained steady.
Yet, evidence from New Hampshire does not mean that price transparency could
not contain costs in another context. Building on the NHID’s 2009 study, Tu and Lauer
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(2009) noted two potential reasons for the lack of impact: (1) weak provider competition due
to geographical segmentation and few competitors, and (2) only five percent of privately
insured state residents being enrolled in high-deductible plans in 2007 (Tu & Lauer, 2009).
The first reason would reduce consumer ability to shop around, while the second reason
would limit the incentives to do so.
3.1.2 Consumers shopping around for medication
There is evidence that consumers comparison-shop when able. Hsu et al.’s 2008
study on Medicare beneficiaries’ responses to drug costs provides evidence that consumers
shop around for prescription drugs when they bear significant costs of their care (Hsu, Fung,
Price, & al., 2008). The study provides little insight into healthcare providers, but does speak
to the larger question of how patients use price information in making healthcare decisions.
Hsu et al. (2008) conducted 1,040 telephone interviews in a stratified random sample of
community-dwelling Kaiser Permanente-Northern California Medicare Advantage
beneficiaries aged 65 or older (Hsu et al., 2008). They measured cost-related responses in
terms of cost-coping behaviors such as switching to lower-cost medications, reduced
adherence such as not refilling prescriptions, and financial burden, as manifested in going
without necessities (Hsu et al., 2008). 36 percent of respondents reported at least one of
these cost-related responses to drug costs (Hsu et al., 2008). Multivariate analyses showed
that beneficiaries with lower household income more frequently reported cost responses,
with a difference of 14.5 percentage points for those making less than $40,000 per year
compared to those making $40,000 or more per year (Hsu et al., 2008). In light of this
information on consumer response, price transparency seems as though it could facilitate
demand-side change in the healthcare industry.
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3.1.3 Consumers shopping around for providers
The previous study showed that people shop around for medication—but do these
findings hold up in the context of provider selection? A 2014 retrospective cross-sectional
study of an insurer-initiated price transparency program sought to encourage patients to
select high-value providers (Wu, Sylwestrzak, Shah, & DeVries, 2014). The study used
administrative claims data from commercial Blue Cross and Blue Shield health plans in the
Northeast, Midwest, and Southeast regions of the United States. The intervention cohort
resided in the metropolitan hospital service areas of Atlanta, GA; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland,
OH; Indianapolis, IN; and St. Louis, MO. The reference cohort resided in areas in the same
census regions as the intervention group, but in different metropolitan hospital service areas.
Patients had at least one outpatient diagnostic MRI scan during either the preimplementation (2010) or post-implementation (2012) year. There were 61,271 patients in
the intervention cohort and 44,366 patients in the reference cohort, for a total of 105,637
patients who had at least one MRI scan. Age and sex distributions were comparable in the
two groups (Wu et al., 2014).
In the intervention group, patients were informed of price differences among
available MRI facilities and offered the possibility of selecting different providers (Wu et al.,
2014). The intervention group realized a $220 cost reduction per test (18.7 percent),
decreased use of hospital-based facilities (from 53 percent in 2010 to 45 percent in 2012),
and reduced price variation between hospital and nonhospital facilities for the intervention
group by 30 percent (Wu et al., 2014). The reduced price variation speaks to a market
response to the greater information available, one that allows patients to shift to a more
efficient allocation.
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3.2 Barriers to price transparency
The complexity of price transparency is partly due to the large number of
stakeholders. Stakeholders generally in favor of price transparency include consumer
advocacy lobbies, and some physicians. For example, consumer advocacy lobbies, such as
Health Access California,6 call for more consumer power in making healthcare choices, and
were behind California’s 2003 passing of price transparency legislation (Berger, 2013).
Meanwhile, the Alliance for Academic Internal Medicine (AAIM) and the American College
of Physicians (ACP) promote high-value, cost-conscious care principles (Smith, 2012), while
other supporters include the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF),7 the AARP,8 the
Alliance for Quality Improvement and Patient Safety (AQIPS),9 and The Alliance.10
More hesitant in its support of price transparency is the Federation of American
Hospitals, which represents more than 1,000 investor-owned or managed community
hospitals and health systems throughout the United States (Finance, 2013). In its statement

6

Health Access California is the statewide coalition for California healthcare consumers (California, 2015). It
was founded in 1987 and advocates for quality, affordable healthcare for all Californians (California, 2015).
Recent efforts include county-based initiatives such as the Low-Income Health Programs, the country’s largest
early expansion of Medicaid under the ACA (California, 2015).
7 Risa Lavizzo-Mourey, president and CEO of RWJF, was quoted in 2013 as saying, in praise of the new federal
publication of chargemaster data for the most common Medicare procedures: “Transformation of the
healthcare delivery system cannot occur without greater price transparency. While more work lies ahead, the
release of these hospital price data will allow us to shine a light on the often vast variations in hospital charges”
(HHS, 2013).
8 In a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, the
AARP wrote: “Full transparency through public release of all relevant data, including physician data, is essential
for a vibrant, effective, and competitive marketplace in Medicare. Thus, the program itself, the people it serves,
and the public at-large, have a vested interest in understanding how Medicare dollars are used by physicians and
other healthcare providers” (AARP et al., 2013).
9 Also in a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates,
AQIPS wrote: “Releasing Medicare claims data to the public will fuel a tremendous amount of learning about
and improvement of the quality and cost of healthcare. The real value of public Medicare data will be realized
through the innovation that it catalyzes” (AARP et al., 2013).
10 The Alliance is a non-for-profit cooperative owned by employers that provide self-funded health benefits to
more than 80,000 employees and their family members across three states, and wrote in a 2013 comment
submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates: “When patients seek care,
they generally do so at the individual physician level as opposed to the hospital level, and they deserve
information on the quality of care provided by individual physicians” (AARP et al., 2013).
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for the record before the Senate Committee on Finance on June 18, 2013, the Federation of
American Hospitals prefaces its contributions by stating that it “supports efforts to promote
transparency and provide quality and price information that enhances consumer choice.” It
proceeds to condemn the recent release of hospital charge data from Medicare inpatient and
outpatient procedures, writing, “CMS MISSES THE MARK BY PROVIDING
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION FOR CONSUMERS” (formatting and capitalization
in original) (Finance, 2013). It argues that:
Unfortunately, the CMS charge data release is more likely to confuse consumers than
provide meaningful, useful information, and even worse, it could mislead consumers into
making a wrong choice that could actually harm them. This is because the charges posted by
CMS are not prices in the conventional sense that consumers think of them—that is, the
actual price patients are expected to pay for their care. (Finance, 2013)

It bears repeating that a significant challenge for price transparency is the drastic
difference between chargemaster rates and prices paid. Chargemaster rates are easy to
provide and not very useful to consumers; prices paid information is difficult to provide but
much more useful to consumers. In its 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Finance, the American Hospital Association (AHA) highlights the challenge of providing
meaningful information to consumers:
Hospital care is specifically tailored to the needs of each individual patient. For example, a
gallbladder operation for one patient may be relatively simple, but for another patient, it
could be fraught with unforeseen complications, making meaningful “up front” pricing
difficult and, perhaps, confusing for patients...It is also important to note that, for most
patients, what is most important and relevant is how much they will be required to pay outof-pocket. Because insurers determine how high their customers’ out-of-pocket rates will be,
patients need insurers to provide real-time information. (Finance, 2013)

Branching off from the consumer-centric concerns raised by the Federation of
American Hospitals and the American Hospital Association, other stakeholders generally
opposed to transparency include managed care organizations, the hospital industry, insurers,
and pharmaceutical companies. For example, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
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of America (PhRMA), which represents the leading research-based pharmaceutical
companies in the U.S., advocated against a price transparency bill that was rejected in
Congress in 2010, because “overly broad proposals” could raise prices across the board due
to too much transparency (Berger, 2013). The American Academy of Dermatology
Association (AADA) and the American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons
(AAOMS) also tend to oppose price transparency, arguing that it may “degrade the
physician-patient relationship” 11 and “publicly vilify” dermatologists.12
Now that we have encountered the main viewpoints on price transparency, let us
turn our attentions to politics. Political barriers to price transparency stem from the fact that
it is difficult to precisely pinpoint price transparency’s location in the ideological spectrum.
On the one hand, it fosters market participation; on the other, it requires government
intervention. We then see price and quality transparency being championed by Republicans
and Democrats alike,13 with support and opposition from both parties.14,15 Paul Ginsburg

11 In a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, the
American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons raised concerns including “the AAOMS believes that
there is a risk with disclosing physician payment information as it may degrade the physician-patient
relationship when there is no cause nor benefit for doing so” (AARP et al., 2013).
12 In a 2013 comment submitted on a CMS proposal to publicize physician-specific reimbursement rates, the
American Academy of Dermatology Association raised concerns including “Publicly vilifying [dermatologists in
some areas] is not only inaccurate and unfair, but may result in their termination of these paraprofessionals,
with a resulting decrease in access to care for Medicare beneficiaries, in order to normalize their practice
profiles” (AARP et al., 2013).
13 On October 17, 2006, Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue, a Republican, signed an executive order creating the
Health Information Technology and Transparency Advisory Board (Seals, 2006). “Transparency in the
healthcare marketplace is essential,” he said. “Increased transparency in Georgia’s healthcare industry will help
families make informed decisions based on the costs and the quality of the services they receive” (Seals, 2006).
Governor Perdue’s executive order followed mere months after President Bush’s Executive Order on August
22, 2006 was signed, to “Help Increase the Transparency of America’s Healthcare System—Empowering
Americans to Find Better Value and Better Care” (Seals, 2006). In 2009, Representative Steve Kagan (D-Wisc.)
proposed the Transparency in All Health Care Pricing Act (H.R. 4700). “There is no reason patients should be
prevented from knowing the price of a pill before they buy it—and knowing what the person in line in front of
them is paying for the same prescription,” he argued during hearings in the E&C Committee’s Subcommittee
on Health on May 6. (Barlas, 2010)
14 For example, the Health Care Price Transparency Promotion Act of 2012 (which died in the House of
Representatives) was sponsored by Michael Burgess (R-TX). The bill’s three co-sponsors were John Carter (RTX), Gene Green (D-TX), and Mac Thornberry (R-TX) (Impulse, 2014).
15 In 2012, Arizona attempted to pass price transparency legislation, but it was killed by a large majority of both
Democrats and Republicans because of massive pushback from industry representatives, with 50 in attendance
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notes in his 2013 statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance that the goal of
healthcare price transparency is “lowering prices by engaging consumers to choose providers
on the basis of value” (Finance, 2013). Given the marked increase in the frequency of
legislative deadlock over the past decade (Binder, 2014), the level of agreement on the
desirability of transparency in healthcare is remarkable.

Figure 2: All-payer claims databases (APCDs) and price transparency, 2014-2015
(map)

(Source of information for map: A. Council, 2015b; Delbanco, 2014)

Figure 2 demonstrates the extent to which APCDs coincide with price transparency
legislation—34 states had some combination of existing transparency legislation and an
APCD in existence, in the process of implementation, with strong interest, or existing

at the bill’s final stakeholder meeting to argue against it (Berger, 2013). The bill was sponsored by a Republican,
Nancy Barto, who argued that the resistance was so strong because hospitals and device manufacturers benefit
from keeping their prices secret and high (Berger, 2013).
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voluntarily. Twelve states developed all-payer claims databases, and six states were in the
process of implementing APCDs as of 2015 (A. Council, 2015b).
Given the growing presence of price transparency initiatives, let us attempt to
pinpoint price transparency’s location in the political spectrum. As depicted in Figure 3,
analysis of seven price transparency bills on the federal level from 2007 to 2013 showed that
61 percent of sponsors were Republicans.16 With a small sample size of 31 sponsors, that
percentage was statistically significant at a 90 percent confidence interval (t = 1.9837; p =
0.0565).
Figure 3: Federal legislation for price transparency: Partisan sponsorship of House
and Senate bills (chart)
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(Sources for information in chart: Delbanco, 2014; Impulse, 2015)

Yet, as Figure 4 shows, the pattern of Republicans pushing for price transparency
does not hold up on the state level. Of 174 pieces of price transparency legislation passed in
16

These seven bills—H.R. 2853 (2013), H.R. 1326 (2013), H.R. 5800 (2012), H.R. 4803 (2010), H.R. 2249
(2009), H.R. 2566 (2009), and S. 2221 (2007)—were found through using the terms “price,” “transparency,”
and “healthcare” to search ProQuest Congressional Publications. To increase the timeliness of the findings, the
search results were limited to the year 2007 onward.
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45 states between 1956 and 2013, 60.47 percent passed when state legislatures were a
majority Democrats (t = 2.827; p = 0.005), and 60.51 percent passed when the state
governor was a Democrat (t = 2.837; p = 0.005) (sources of information: Delbanco, 2014;
NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine).

Figure 4: State legislation for price transparency: Partisan control of state legislature
and party affiliation of governor when legislation passed (chart)

40%

Democratic
Republican

60%

(Sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine)

However, it bears mentioning that laws vary widely between states, and that not all
price transparency legislation is created equal. Inconsistencies in legislation are tied to party
differences: of the five states that received passing grades for their price transparency laws in
2014 when evaluated by Catalyst for Payment Reform (Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts,
Vermont, and Virginia), four had Democratic governors in 2013 and one had a Republican
governor (Delbanco, 2014). Inconsistencies in implementation can be seen in how some
states have enacted price transparency measures: some have state-mandated websites, and
some have voluntary websites (NCSL, 2015b) (WSJ, 2014) (Delbanco, 2014). Variation
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between states is useful for this thesis because it makes it easier to tell, through trial and
error, what works and what does not.

Figure 5: Price transparency and political parties in control of state legislation in 2014
(map)

(Source of information for map: A. Council, 2015b; Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2014)

Meanwhile, the debate about price transparency is closely observed and participated
in by major stakeholders, for whom different outcomes would be ideal. These stakeholders
include the government, healthcare providers, and healthcare payers. For some, the current
opaqueness of healthcare, with little data on price and quality, is beneficial. For others, it is
highly problematic. The government has a consumer protection role, with a simultaneous
interest in budgetary sustainability because it is also the payer for Medicare.17 Healthcare

17

As an example of the consumer protection function of the government, then-Secretary of HHS Sebelius was
quoted in 2013 as saying, in support of the HHS initiative to make chargemaster data public: “Currently,
consumers don’t know what a hospital is charging them or their insurance company for a given procedure, like
a knee replacement, or how much of a price difference there is at different hospitals, even within the same city.
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providers have an interest in keeping their business practices private, although many have
been forced to release chargemaster data, through the state of California’s Payer’s Bill of
Rights, enacted in 2005 (Development, 2012). Healthcare payers, primarily insurance
companies, negotiate rates separately with each hospital, competing with each other to get
more favorable terms. Their goal is to keep their business practices and terms of agreement
private to the extent that doing so will protect their businesses.
3.3 Federal initiatives for price transparency
One federal source of price information is the Hospital Provider Charge and Actual
Payment Data, released in August 2013 by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). It compares the charges for the 100 most common inpatient services and 30
common outpatient services across the nation. It includes the "list prices" on initial
submitted bills, as well as the actual amounts paid by Medicare nationwide, covering 3,300
hospitals, with more than 170,000 listed price data points. This data set only shows what
Medicare pays, not what private payers negotiate with providers, nor what consumers would
pay out of pocket.
Public reception to the federal government releasing payment information varies. On
August 6, 2013, CMS issued a Request for Public Comments on the Potential Release of
Medicare Physician Data, seeking input on whether to make individual physician payment
information publicly available and, if so, in what form (CMS, 2013b). CMS opened the
proposed policy to public comment following a 2013 Florida federal district court decision
to lift an injunction on the disclosure of individual physician reimbursement information
This data and new data centers will help fill that gap” (HHS, 2013). Relating more closely to the government’s
concern with budgetary sustainability, a 2013 request for public comment included the statement: “CMS
recognizes the role data can play in achieving the common goal of better quality healthcare at lower costs”
(CMS, 2013c).
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that had been in place since 1979 (CMS, 2013b, 2013c). During the comment period, from
August 6, 2013 through September 6, 2013, CMS received more than 130 comments,
representing the views of over 300 organizations and individuals (CMS, 2013b). Starting in
February 2014, the first quality measures were added to Physician Compare, a website
created by the Affordable Care Act that involves groups reporting quality data through the
Physician Quality Reporting System (CMS, 2015a).
Another federal initiative attempts to foster state-run price transparency: in 2013,
HHS made $87 million available to states, to be used for their rate review programs and to
further healthcare pricing transparency (HHS, 2013). The simultaneous funding of data
centers to collect, analyze, and publish healthcare pricing and medical claims reimbursement
data was intended to make these data useful to consumers (HHS, 2013).
3.4 State initiatives for price transparency
State approaches to price transparency differ in terms of the measures of price, the
modes of presentation, and the content presented. In this section, I present examples of
states that have done price transparency well. I argue that their successful elements are built
on an assumption of boundedly rational consumers. For example, when the information is
only on the aggregate level, it can be useful for policymakers. However, it will not be very
useful for the average consumer’s budgeting purposes to know that surgeries at a given
hospital usually cost about $40,000.
Example states were selected through a multi-step process. The first step was
determining which states received passing grades on the 2014 Report Card on State Price
Transparency Laws. The Report Card was released in 2013 and again in 2014 by two
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nonprofit organizations: Catalyst for Payment Reform18 and Health Care Incentives
Improvement Institute19 (Delbanco, 2014). The Report Card seeks “to examine consumers’
access to price information in all 50 states, using well-defined grading criteria applied to laws,
regulations, and state-mandated websites” (Delbanco, 2014). The grading criteria can be
viewed in the report, which awards points based on attributes such as scope, ease of use,
utility, and accuracy for websites. States receiving “passing” grades on the 2014 Report Card
on State Price Transparency Laws are Colorado (receiving a C), Maine (B), Massachusetts
(B), Vermont (C), and Virginia (C). The remaining 45 states failed.
The second step was to cross-reference the list of passing-grade states with
information from the All-Payer Claims Database Council. An all-payer claims database
(henceforth “APCD”) is a large-scale database that systematically collects medical claims,
pharmacy claims, dental claims, and eligibility and provider files from private and public
payers, with the first statewide APCD system established in Maine in 2003 (A. Council,
January 2014). An APCD differs from a chargemaster significantly in that an APCD
provides information on prices actually paid for care, whereas a chargemaster only includes
prices that form the starting point for negotiation. The APCD Council serves in an
information-sharing capacity for states with all-payer healthcare claims databases and runs a
website with information on initiatives taking place in each state (A. Council, 2015a). Using
the APCD Council website enabled states that had scored poorly on the Report Card to
nonetheless be considered for their alternate efforts. From the APCD Council website

18

Catalyst for Payment Reform, founded in 2010, is “an independent, nonprofit corporation working on behalf
of large employers and other health care purchasers to catalyze improvements in how we pay for health
services and promote higher-value care in the U.S” (CPR, 2015).
19 The Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute is a non-profit that resulted from a merger of Bridges to
Excellence (programs to reward healthcare practitioners who meet certain performance measures) and
PROMETHEUS Payment (a compensation approach based on medical episodes of care), and aims to improve
health care quality and value with evidence-based incentive programs and a fair and powerful model for
payment reform (HCI3, 2015).
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emerged a list of all states with existing APCD systems: Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and
Vermont.
Table 1: Criteria for price transparency case selection
Criteria
Did the state’s price
transparency receive a
passing grade in 2014?

States meeting the criteria
1. 2014 Report Card on State
Colorado
Price Transparency Laws
Maine
Massachusetts
Vermont
Virginia
2. 2015 APCD Council list
Does the state currently have Colorado
of state initiatives
an APCD?
Kansas
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
New Hampshire
Oregon
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Utah
Vermont
(Source of information for table: A. Council, 2015a; Delbanco, 2014)

Once states had been identified, four of the states’ initiatives were evaluated
according to a conception of the consumer as boundedly rational. The four states analyzed
were Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. The first step was to evaluate
the consumer-friendliness of price transparency measures. As I established in Chapter 2, it
will be necessary for price transparency to properly define the parameters in which
consumers will make their decisions. New Hampshire was among the first states to build an
APCD and allowing consumers to input their own insurance information and see what
specific procedures will cost, and Massachusetts developed a consumer-friendly Web site
showing the amount paid and quality side by side (CIVHC, 2014a). Other states started out
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with information targeted for policymakers but are currently in the process of making
information available to consumers.20 Next, the user-friendliness of the websites themselves
was evaluated. User-friendliness can be enhanced by tailoring of information to the
consumer’s needs. For instance, Maine’s website offers a “Cost Compare” feature, which
allows consumers to select a procedure category, select a specific procedure from within that
category, and see the average cost of that procedure at different health care facilities in
Maine (MHDO, 2014). Finally, state price websites were evaluated on the basis of the
completeness of information presented. For instance, one measure of completeness is
whether there is information available on any given procedure from any given provider in
the state. All criteria are described in Table 2.

20

For example, Virginia started collecting data for an all-payer claims database (APCD) in 2012, and projected
to make its data available online in the spring of 2015. Virginia’s APCD data has two purposes: (1) improving
public health surveillance, population health, and alternative delivery and payment models, and (2) enabling
“healthcare purchasers, including employers and consumers, […] to compare quality and efficiency of
healthcare” ("All-Payer Claims Database created; purpose; reporting requirements.," 2012; VHI, 2015).
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Table 2: Criteria for price transparency case evaluation
Criteria
States meeting the criteria
1. User-friendliness of price
Is price information specific Colorado
measures
enough for consumers to
Maine
infer what their own
Massachusetts
treatment will cost, by
New Hampshire
providing:
(a) Reimbursement in
addition to
chargemaster data?
(b) Procedure-specific
in addition to or
instead of overall
hospital rates?
2. User-friendliness of
Does the website tailor
Colorado
website
information to the
Maine
consumer’s specific needs
Massachusetts
through interactivity by:
New Hampshire
(a) Allowing comparison
of specific hospitals?
(b) Allowing searching
by condition or
treatment?
3. Completeness of
Is information available:
Colorado
information
(a) On any given
Massachusetts
procedure?
New Hampshire
(b) On all relevant
payers?
(c) On all relevant
providers?
(d) For all recent years?
(Source of information for table: A. Council, 2015a; Delbanco, 2014)

3.4.1 Colorado
Colorado received a passing grade on the 2014 Report Card on State Price
Transparency Laws (Delbanco, 2014). Its APCD has collected data since 2012, and the
launch of the Colorado APCD public facing website was November 1, 2012 (A. Council,
2015a). I will first provide a brief history of Colorado’s price transparency, then evaluate the
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user-friendliness of its price measures and website, in addition to the completeness of
information on its website.
Colorado’s All Payer Claims Database (APCD) legislation (Colorado House Bill 101330) went into effect in late summer 2010. It was signed by then-Governor Bill Ritter
(Democrat) on May 26, 2010. The legislation set out a number of required actions and
milestones, including the appointment of an advisory committee to guide the creation of
Colorado's APCD (A. Council, 2015a). In 2010, the advisory committee named the Center
for Improving Value in Health Care (CIVHC), a non-profit organization, as the
administrator for Colorado APCD (A. Council, 2015a). Treo Solutions, which offers
consulting services and data analytics to commercial and government health plans, began
collecting three years of historic claims information in early 2012 (A. Council, 2015a).

User-friendliness of Colorado’s price measures
The Colorado APCD public-facing website, Colorado Medical Price Compare,
launched on November 1, 2012, providing high-level views of variation in cost and
utilization for approximately two million commercial and Medicaid covered lives (A.
Council, 2015a). Because there was no pricing on the medical services level, consumers
could not estimate their treatment costs. As a result, it was not very useful for consumers
deciding which hospital to use. In 2013, the Colorado APCD on-boarded additional claims
data (including Medicare) and expanded the public reporting of comparative cost, quality and
value information (A. Council, 2015a). 3 CCR 702-4:4-2-31, which was added in 2010 and
last amended in 2013, marked the first legislation in Colorado that made public the paid
amount, not charge, by requiring “the average of all reimbursement rates that a carrier paid,
by MS-DRG code” to be “reported to the Division” (that is, reported to the state). In 2014,
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Colorado Medical Price Compare included reports estimating the amount that a hospital,
surgery center, physician or other health care professional receives for its services, and how
much one would have to pay out-of-pocket for that service (CIVHC, 2014a).
Another website available is Colorado Hospital Price Report, which predates
Colorado Medical Price Compare and which is a joint project of the Colorado Hospital
Association and the Colorado Division of Insurance. It is intended to provide consumers
and purchasers of health care with information about hospital charges and insurance
company or health maintenance organization reimbursement rates. The website includes the
25 most common inpatient medical conditions and surgical procedures performed in
Colorado hospitals in 2013. It includes reimbursement by company and by group code, for
2009 through 2013.

User-friendliness of Colorado’s website
Although Colorado received a passing grade for its laws, its implementation did not,
because the CPR 2014 report card rated the Colorado Hospital Price Report website instead
of Colorado Medical Price Compare. The CPR 2014 report card rated Colorado Hospital
Price Report, Colorado’s state-mandated website, as “poor” for utility and ease of use
(Delbanco, 2014). Nonetheless, since 2013, a consumer can search Colorado Hospital Price
Report for comprehensive prices for select hospital-based services, by location and insurance
(A. Council, 2015a). This is the sort of tailoring that prevents information overload, thereby
making it more likely that a boundedly rational consumer will make the optimal decision.
Furthermore, the wording of Colorado legislation suggests that lawmakers are aware
of the importance of a user-friendly website. Colorado Revised Statutes §10-16-134, added in
2008, requires “the [Colorado Hospital Association’s] web site and information [to be] easy
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to navigate [and] contain consumer-friendly language.” Colorado Rev. Stat. Ann. § 250.031253-703 mandates disclosure of charge information “on an internet web site in a
manner that allows consumers to conduct an interactive search that allows them to view and
compare.” Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25.5-1-204, added in 2010 and amended in 2013, required
both charge and paid amount to be made “available to the public […] in a consumer-friendly
manner,” allowing “consumers to identify and compare health plans, health insurers, health
care facilities, and health care providers regarding the provision of safe, cost-effective, highquality health care services.”
Figure 6: Colorado Medical Price Compare (screenshot)

(CIVHC, 2014b)

Completeness of information on Colorado’s website
The CPR 2014 report card rated Colorado Hospital Price Report, Colorado’s statemandated website, as “average” for the scope and accuracy of its data (Delbanco, 2014).
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Although information is available on all relevant providers and for all recent years,
information is not available on any given procedure. The initial launch of the website
displayed price and quality information for a limited number of hospital-based services: total
knee replacement, total hip replacement, uncomplicated vaginal birth, and cesarean birth.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-3-705, added in 2008 and amended in 2011, mandated that “each
hospital” release “the mean charge” of “the twenty-give most common inpatient diagnosticrelated groups.” In 2015, approximately 30 procedures including imaging services across a
variety of facility types are expected to be available. In addition, prices at the provider group
level will eventually be incorporated, allowing consumers to evaluate common preventative
services such as annual check-ups (CIVHC, 2014b).
Information is not available on all payers. When launched, Colorado Medical Price
Compare included data from 2009-2011 from the largest eight carriers in Colorado and from
Medicaid, amounting to claims for over 2 million unique individuals, representing over 40%
of insured Coloradans (CIVHC, 2012). As of December 2013, the APCD included 20092012 historic claims data representing over 2.5 million Coloradans (CIVHC, 2012). Medical
services prices were based on 2012 claims data. Self-funded commercial insurance claims
data and claims for patients 65 and over were not included in the data (CIVHC, 2012). As of
Version 2.0, the APCD includes health insurance claims from the 13 largest health plans for
individual, large group fully insured and some self-insured lives, as well as Medicaid (CIVHC,
2014a).
3.4.2 Maine
Maine HealthCost was introduced in May 2009 (Tu & Lauer, 2009). The Maine
Health Data Organization (MHDO) collects data on health care claims for Maine residents.
Maine Revised Statutes §8712, added in 2003 and most recently amended in 2012, requires
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“health care facilities and practitioners” to make available “payments for services rendered”
for elective procedures to the uninsured, so that the state can “create a publicly accessible
interactive website.” Maine Revised Statutes §8712, added 2003 and last amended in 2012,
requires “the release of prices paid by individual commercial health insurance companies, 3rdparty administrators and, unless prohibited by federal law, governmental payors” for the 15
most common diagnosis-related groups and outpatient procedures for all hospitals in the
State.
User-friendliness of Maine’s price measures and website
The CPR 2014 Report Card rated Maine’s state-mandated website as “excellent” in
terms of accuracy of data. The average cost amount reported in HealthCost is the average
payment to the provider for a procedure based on the claims data collected by the
MHDO. The CPR 2014 Report Card rated Maine’s state-mandated website as “average” in
terms of utility and ease of use. The Cost Compare function provides an overall idea of a
procedure’s average cost by facility (MHDO, 2014). Overall, Maine’s price measures and
websites effectively tailor price information to the consumer’s needs, thereby anticipating the
constraints of bounded rationality.
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Figure 7: Maine HealthCost (screenshot)

Completeness of information on Maine’s website
The CPR 2014 Report Card rated Maine’s state-mandated website as “good” in
terms of scope. Maine’s website does not include information on all relevant providers. On
the MHDO’s website, it presents the average cost of specific medical procedures at over 50
different high-volume health care facilities and hospitals around the state. The current site
includes data from providers who are part of a health care facility. Approximately 80 percent
of primary care physicians and 50 percent of specialists are employed by a health care facility
or hospital (MHDO, 2014).
Maine’s website does not include information on all procedures. Users can compare
the average cost of approximately 200 procedures at over 50 high volume health care
facilities and hospitals. Neither does Maine’s website include information on all relevant
payers. The information used to calculate the average cost is from claims data collected by
MHDO (as required by law) from all licensed health plans in the State and third-party
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administrators. The MHDO reviewed over 7 million claims from 42 health insurance
providers. At present, it does not include Medicaid and Medicare claims data.
Nor does Maine HealthCost include information for all recent years. The data in this
release cover the time period of July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013. Q1 2014 APCD Data was
released in August 2014, and includes commercial claims and MaineCare data (A. Council,
2015a).
3.4.3 Massachusetts
My Health Care Options has been live since late 2008.21 The Massachusetts All-Payer
Claims Database began collecting claims data in 2008, with claims dating back to July 2006.
In summer 2012, the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy released a
“preliminary release” of APCD datasets based on private payer data from 2008-2010. That
November, the Center for Health Information and Analysis (CHIA) assumed responsibility
for the MA APCD. Release 1.0, which CHIA made available in June 2013, included data for
2009 through 2011 from both private and public payers. CHIA finalized Release 2.0, which
included data for 2009-2012, in January 2014 (CHIA, 2014). CHIA’s APCD data is only
released in custom abstracts to users who make it through a multi-layer screening process,
although it is used in conjunction with other data sources to create the My Health Care
Options ratings (CHIA, 2014).

21

I have concluded this from triangulating from a few sources: The Massachusetts House FY2010 budget
recommendation, published in 2009, referred to “the Council’s recently launched ‘My Health Care Options’
website” (Patrick & Murray, 2009). More concretely, archive.org’s Wayback Machine saved the website 308
times between December 12, 2008 and August 17, 2014 (Archive, 2014). I cannot tell from the archived
version which medical conditions were available for cost and quality comparisons, though there is an
announcement on the version archived on December 25, 2010, stating: “This Website was enhanced in July
2010 to include updated acute care hospital quality measures, updated text and links, and the addition of
medical groups' clinical quality data from the Massachusetts Health Quality Partners (MHQP).” The website
also received an update in 2010, according to an August 2010 blog post (Guiltinan, 2010).
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The statute creating the Massachusetts Health Care Quality and Cost Council statute
expresses a desire to improve health care quality, reduce racial and ethnic disparities and
contain health care costs (A. Council, 2015a). The authority to collect claims data was
established under the same legislation that established the Council (A. Council, 2015a). Since
then, the Division was given authority, under a separate bill, to examine cost containment
(A. Council, 2015a).
User-friendliness of Massachusetts’ price measures and website
Massachusetts General Laws 12C §8 Part (d), added in 2012, require the public
reporting of and placement on the state website of inpatient and outpatient relative prices.
The Massachusetts Health Care Quality and Cost Council was established to design a
consumer-friendly website that would provide transparency about healthcare costs and
quality for the public. My Health Care Options allows comparison of specific hospitals and
allows searching by condition or treatment, as shown in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Massachusetts My Health Care Options (screenshot)

(H. C. Q. a. C. Council, 2014)

Completeness of information on Massachusetts’ website
The Division adopted new regulations in July 2010 and includes the collection of
medical claims and information from member eligibility, provider, and product files
encompassing fully-insured, self-insured, Medicare, and Medicaid data (A. Council, 2015a).
As of 2010, the Health Care Quality and Cost Council had collected insurance carrier claims
data on the privately, fully insured for nearly three years. It posted currently posts data on 19
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inpatient conditions and 18 diagnostic tests on its consumer website, My Health Care
Options (DHCFP, 2010).
In 2012, Massachusetts’ regulation 129 MA ADC 2.05 was added, requiring “each
carrier” (of insurance) to “submit to the Council” “a completed health care claims data set”
“for all Massachusetts resident members.” Also in 2012, Massachusetts’ regulation 129 MA
ADC 2.09 was added, requiring “carriers” to report “medical and pharmacy claims” and
“claims for capitated services […] at the visit, service, or prescription level.” Further
regulation requires the reporting of financial and other information to the state.22

3.4.4 New Hampshire
I will first provide a brief history of New Hampshire’s price transparency, then
evaluate the user-friendliness of its price measures and website, in addition to the
completeness of information on its website. NH HealthCost, launched in 2007, is a publicly
available website that provides median bundled prices for about 20 common, mostly
outpatient, services, using the claims data from New Hampshire’s all-payer claims database
(Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). The New Hampshire Comprehensive Healthcare Information
System began accepting claims submissions in 2005 in response to a need for more
transparency in the commercial insurance system. The drivers listed in the statute include the
provision of a resource for continuous review of health care utilization, expenditures, and
performance data by insurers, purchasers, employers, providers and state agencies (Tu &
Gourevitch, 2014). Also expressed was the goal to help consumers and employers make
informed and cost effective health care choices (Tu & Gourevitch, 2014).

22

See 101 MA ADC 345.05, 114.1 CMR 17.03, 114.1 CMR 17.01, 114.1 CMR 39.03, 40.03, 42.03, 42.04, 114.5
CMR 21.03, 957 CMR 2.01, 957 CMR 2.05 (Delbanco, 2014).
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In addition, the NH Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Medicaid
Business and Policy (OMPB), wanted to be able to compare Medicaid quality, cost,
utilization, and price to those of other payers (Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). For the OMPB, the
reporting agenda is focused on how health care quality, access, use, and cost vary
geographically, between providers, and most importantly between the Medicaid-covered and
commercially insured populations as well as benchmarking of payment rates (Tu &
Gourevitch, 2014).
User-friendliness of New Hampshire’s price measures and website
The NHID uses claims data to better understand the health insurance market in
New Hampshire as well as to provide New Hampshire residents with information about the
cost of health care services. To date, the NHID has developed the NH HealthCost website
for insurers and is in the process of developing a second website for employers (A. Council,
2015a). NH HealthCost allows comparison of specific hospitals and allows searching by
condition or treatment type. Furthermore, it allows website users to enter details about their
insurance carrier and the specifics of their plan, then tailors results to that information, as
shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: New Hampshire HealthCost (screenshot)

Completeness of information on New Hampshire’s website
HealthCost provides median bundled prices for about 20 common, mostly
outpatient, services, using the claims data from New Hampshire’s all-payer claims database
(Tu & Gourevitch, 2014). Its data includes all providers and major payers.
3.5 Private initiatives for price transparency
Private initiatives for price transparency do not have the force of law behind them,
but can result in useful websites through stakeholder support. Examples of state-specific
private initiatives for price transparency include Montana Hospital Association PricePoint
system website, the California Foundation, and the Oregon Association of Hospitals and
Health Systems PricePoint system website.
On the nationwide level, we see Castlight Health was founded in 2008 and is a
healthcare information company that offers comparison tools for the price and quality of
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healthcare providers (Castlight, 2015). Its clients include self-insured companies such as WalMart and Honeywell (Campbell, 2014).
OpsCost is a privately run website that allows charge comparison for common
procedures at over 3,000 hospitals using data from the government and from user-reported
bills (OpsCost, 2015). When evaluated according to the criteria used earlier for state
transparency websites, OpsCost performs reasonably well. Its price measures are not very
user-friendly, providing both billed and reimbursed amounts. However, they are tailored to
specific providers. The website is user-friendly, tailoring information to the consumer’s
specific needs, and it allows the comparison of specific hospitals. Finally, it includes
information on all treatment types.
The design of insurance plans impacts the effectiveness of price transparency.
Patients with high-deductible plans will tend to be more price-sensitive, for instance. The
Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) was established in 2011 to draw on health care cost and
utilization data for Americans covered by private insurance (HCCI, 2015). Through research
and access to a large health insurance claims database, HCCI addresses health care spending
and utilization for the privately insured health population (HCCI, 2015). Its data
contributors are Aetna, Humana, Kaiser Permanente, and UnitedHealthcare (HCCI, 2015).
In 2015, HCCI launched guroo, a consumer-focused website providing national,
state, and local cost and quality information for common conditions and services based on
data from around 40 million Americans (HCCI, 2015). When evaluated according to the
same criteria used for state transparency websites, guroo performs reasonably well. Its price
measures are user-friendly, providing procedure-specific cost estimates. However, they are
not tailored to specific providers, but rather to the geographic region, which is less useful for
a consumer trying to decide which hospital to attend. The website is user-friendly, tailoring
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information to the consumer’s specific needs, but it does not allow the comparison of
specific hospitals. Finally, its information is incomplete: there are conditions not yet
included.
With the connection between insurance and healthcare prices, it is unsurprising that
we see insurance companies beginning to engage in transparency. In 2010, Aetna introduced
Member Payment Estimator, an online tool enabling members to estimate costs (HFMA,
2015). It allows estimates of both in-network and out-of-network physician care costs
(HFMA, 2015). Not to be outperformed, in 2012, UnitedHealthcare launched a consumer
cost estimator tool for in-network hospitals and physicians: myHealthcare Cost Estimator,
or myHCE (UnitedHealthcare, 2015). For those covered by UnitedHealthcare, it should be
very useful, providing the ability for consumers to compare quality and cost for more than
574,900 different healthcare providers and 4,275 hospitals (UnitedHealthcare, 2015).
Meanwhile, Humana currently offers MyChoice Tools for provider comparison (Humana,
2015).
3.6 Chapter conclusion
This chapter has presented the current state of affairs for price transparency in the
U.S. hospital market, including evidence of Republicans and Democrats advocating for price
transparency. Without changes in insurance benefit designs to encourage patients to choose
high-value providers, price transparency will have limited impact. The examples included
also highlighted the disjunction between what makes sense to consumers and what the
healthcare industry is currently doing, thereby dealing with the ethical aspects of price
transparency in addition to the political and economic.
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Chapter 4 Implementing quality transparency

In 2012, Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center’s patient safety made headlines when
it received an F on Leapfrog Group’s scoring of the hospital (Terhune, 2012). Since then,
Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center has risen to a C for Leapfrog Group ratings (Terhune,
2015). Leapfrog Group is an employer-backed nonprofit focused on healthcare quality, and
is one of a growing number of healthcare rating organizations seeking to provide more
information to consumers and employers (Terhune, 2012).
More recently, between October 2014 and January 2015, over 100 patients at Ronald
Reagan UCLA Medical Center23 were exposed to an antibiotic-resistant bacterium spread by
endoscopes (AP, 2015). Two patient deaths have already been attributed to the bacterium
(AP, 2015). In January 2014, Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle announced that 32
patients were infected with a similar bacterial strain, due to contaminated endoscopes being
used between 2012 and 2014, resulting in eleven deaths during that time (Terhune, 2015).
These news stories speak to the sometimes-fraught role that quality transparency
plays in the U.S. hospital industry, whether initiated by the media, private rankings groups, or
the federal government. Quality in healthcare can be a matter of life or death, unlike in some
other industries—for example, in retail, a poor-quality shirt is not newsworthy. Yet, in
industries like retail, there are clear indicators of quality—name brands, jaw-dropping price
tags—that are not present to the same extent in healthcare. The U.S. hospital industry does

23

Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center appeared on 225 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists
between 2001 and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology,
geriatrics, gynecology, cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, urology, and rheumatology
(USNWR, Cooper, Craig, & Russell, 2015).
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have its name brands—Mayo Clinic, Mass Gen, Cleveland Clinic—but since they are
geographically inaccessible for many Americans, there have not traditionally been useful
“brand name” heuristics for Americans choosing where to have their cancer treatment.
***
This chapter evaluates the quality transparency initiatives currently available. It
demonstrates the gap between the concept of quality transparency and its implementation.
Many different measures can be used to quantify and communicate quality of care. These
measures can be grouped into three categories: processes of care, outcomes of care, and
patient experience (NCQA, 2007). First, processes of care can be synthesized in practice
guidelines, which are specific sets of care recommendations designed to help healthcare
professionals and patients make decisions about preventing or treating a condition,
developed through review of the best available medical evidence or an expert consensus
process where evidence is lacking (NCQA, 2007).24 The second category focuses on
outcomes of care, such as readmission and mortality rates.25 The third category is patient
experiences, which can include pain management and quality of communication with
practitioners.26
The source of quality can determine the measures it reports. For example, Medicare’s
Hospital Compare provides information about the quality of care at over 4,000 Medicarecertified hospitals, including readmissions, complications, and deaths, while the Leapfrog
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For example, the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) tells employers and consumers
know how well their care follows practice guidelines, such as the percentage of heart attack patients who are
given a beta-blocker to prevent another heart attack (NCQA, 2007).
25 The Medicare Health Outcomes Survey (HOS) assesses the physical and mental well-being of people
enrolled in managed care plans (NCQA, 2007). Its first cohort was surveyed in 1998 and resurveyed in 2000
(HOS, 2014).
26 The Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) consists of surveys asking
consumers and patients to report on their healthcare experiences (NCQA, 2007).
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Group provides voluntarily reported hospital survey results on how patients fare, resources
used in caring for patients, and structures that promote patient safety.
4.1 Existing work on quality transparency
Several studies have found evidence of a significant consumer response to health
plan ratings when assessing the impact of health plan ratings on consumer choice (Wedig
and Tai-Seale, 2002; Scanlon et al., 2002; Chernew et al., 2004; Jin and Sorensen, 2005;
Dafny and Dranove, 2005). In the next sections, I present the evidence for consumers using
health plan ratings, consumers shopping around for providers, and the impact of consumer
choice on providers.
4.1.1 Consumers using health plan ratings
Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) test the effect of report cards on consumer choice in the
HMO market. The OPM provided health insurance plan selections of a sample of federal
employees in 1995 and 1996, which was used to match a new hire sample of 649 new hires
in 1995 and 713 new hires in 1996 with a stratified random sample of 4,150 existing hire
choices in 1996 and 3,650 existing hire choices in 1995 (Wedig, 2002). Wedig and Tai-Seale
found statistically significant results at p < 0.05, demonstrating that an increase of one
standard deviation in a report card measure of quality of care increases the likelihood of plan
selection by more than 50 percent (Wedig, 2002). Overall, they offered evidence that
subjective measures of quality and coverage influence plan choices.
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4.1.2 Consumers shopping around for providers
Less work has been done on the effect of rankings and report cards on patients’
choice of provider. Pope (2009) demonstrates that changes in a hospital’s ranking by the US
News and World Report increases non-emergency patient volume and hospital revenue. The
New York State Cardiac Surgery Reporting System provides information on the riskadjusted mortality rates of hospitals performing coronary artery bypass surgery. Cutler et al.
(2004) show a decrease in patient volume for hospitals that performed significantly below
the state average, but no evidence that hospitals performing significantly above average
attracted more patients. Meanwhile, Jha and Epstein (2006) present evidence that New York
Cardiac Surgery ratings did not impact the market share of cardiac patients.
Work on the role of patient choice in healthcare has provided evidence in support of
the right kind of transparency. Estimating the impact of hospital competition in the English
National Health Service following January 2006 reforms, Cooper et al. (2009) presented
results suggesting that hospital competition in markets with fixed prices can lead to
improvements in clinical quality, using AMI mortality to indicate quality and a modified
difference-in-difference estimator. Cutler and Dafny (2011) recommend transparency
initiatives mandating the disclosure of plan-specific patient copayments, to avoid the wrong
kind of transparency, which could harm patients by leading to higher prices. Rosenthal et al.
(2013) found it difficult to obtain bundled price information for a common elective surgical
procedure, indicating pervasive barriers to informed patient choice in the hospital market.
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The literature provides mixed evidence on the consequences of report cards for
healthcare provider performance. Surveys of patients and clinicians reveal both that report
cards can have little effect on decision-making (Schneider & Epstein, 1998) and that they can
have a significant effect on patient placement (Schneider & Epstein, 1996). Schneider and
Epstein’s 1996 study suggests that publication of quality data can significantly impact
healthcare provider performance, but not due to increased patient choice. Analysis of clinical
and administrative data shows that report cards catalyzed improvement in the quality of care
(Hannan, 1994; Peterson, 1998), lending support to the argument that quality transparency
can incentivize healthcare providers to perform better.
4.1.3 The impact of consumer choice on providers
The articles reviewed were largely within the field of health economics, and provided
a framework for understanding what sort of information was already publicly available and
what to look for. An article by Devin Pope (2009) influenced the decision to create a dataset
of the U.S. News and World Report rankings of hospitals for 2001 through 2014. Pope’s
paper includes useful information on how the U.S. News Best Hospital rankings are put
together. The U.S. News and World Report rankings of hospitals is a widely dispersed listing
of the top hospitals (up to 50 rank slots) in each of up to 17 specialties (Pope, 2009). It has
been released annually since 1993, and U.S. News and World Report states that it determines
the rankings according to the following steps (Pope, 2009). First, the hospital must be a
member of the Council of Teaching Hospitals, affiliated with a medical school, or in
possession of certain technological capabilities. (Pope notes that each year, only one-third of
the approximately 6,000 U.S. hospitals meet one of the following criteria.) Second, the
hospital’s reputation is measured by the percentage of surveyed physicians who indicated the
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hospital specialty as one of the top five hospitals in that specialty. Third, the hospitalspecialty’s mortality rate is measured. Finally, other observable hospital characteristics are
taken to account (e.g., nurses-to-beds ratio, number of patients treated, specialty-specific
technologies available).
As a counterpart to the stated methodology of the U.S. News and World Report,
Pope also produces analysis of what actually drives the rankings. Namely, he shows that
reputation scores explain over 95 percent of the variation in the final quality scores, while
risk-adjusted mortality rates explain less than one percent (Pope, 2009). Pope also offers
valuable information on how widely perceived the U.S. News and World Report rankings
seem to be. Specifically, he cites the U.S. News and World Report magazine circulation of
over 2 million27 and the free online availability of the rankings (Pope, 2009).
Pope’s study shows that U.S. News Best Hospital rankings have a large impact on
hospital choice decisions. Yet, consumers of health care may be relatively unresponsive to
change in hospital quality. Pope estimates the response to rankings in the hospital market
(Pope, 2009). He finds that hospitals that improve their rank attract significantly more
patients, by using hospital rankings released by US News and World Report as a proxy for
perceived quality (Pope, 2009). The rankings are broken down by specialty, so he produces
counts of treated patients at the hospital-specialty level. He then estimates the patient
response to these rankings. Pope uses a dummy variable for each hospital specialty, to
control for time in varying hospital characteristics (size, culture), but it does not control for
the number of patients per year. Using mixed and conditional logit estimates of hospital
choice, he shows that distance has a bigger effect than quality. Because patients make
appointments far in advance, which could contaminate results, he uses a falsification test.
27

For a point of reference, the top-ranked U.S. consumer magazine for the second half of 2013, based on
circulation, was the AARP magazine, with 22,274,096 subscribers as of 12/31/2013 (Media, 2014).
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For the falsification test, he shows that a rank change occurring in a subsequent year does
not have an effect on this year’s patient counts. He shows that the average hospital in his
sample experiences a 5% change in non-emergency, Medicare patient volume from year to
year due to rank changes.
Recent work in behavioral economics suggests that simplicity of information content
is an important factor in consumer behavior, and U.S. News seems to have come up with a
system that consumers are can easily to grasp. If one assumes that the sample of hospitals
used in this analysis is representative of the nation as a whole, changes in these hospital
rankings have led to over 15,000 Medicare patients switching from lower to higher-ranked
hospitals for inpatient care, resulting in over 750 million dollars moving from one hospital to
another over the past ten years. But to understand the entire impact of these rankings, it will
be necessary to know whether the response of hospitals to the rankings is efficiency
increasing or decreasing.
Contributing a cautionary note to the dialogue, Dranove et al. (2003) use national
data on Medicare patients at risk for cardiac surgery and cardiac surgery report cards in New
York and Pennsylvania to measure the impact of publishing information on providers’
performance (Dranove, Kessler, McClellan, & Satterthwaite, 2003). Dranove et al. examine
the effects of mandatory CABG surgery report card laws adopted by New York and
Pennsylvania in the early 1990s. Hospital-level trends indicate report card-induced matching,
and patient-level analysis showed that report cards led to an increase in the quantity of
CABG surgery, a decrease in PTCA, and increased delays in the execution of all three
intensive treatments. Their results suggest that report cards can lead to short-term reductions
in welfare by leading to selection behavior by providers, which leads to worse health
outcomes for sicker patients (Dranove et al., 2003).
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4.2 Barriers to quality transparency
In the previous chapter on price transparency, we saw that more Republicans than
Democrats tend to advocate for price transparency more than Democrats. Here, I show that
more Democrats than Republicans have supported quality transparency measures on the
federal and state level. Analysis of seven quality transparency bills on the federal level from
2007 to 2014 showed that 82.5 percent of sponsors were Democrats.28 With a sample size of
140 sponsors, that percentage was statistically significant at a 99.99 percent confidence
interval (t = 7.5601; p < 0.0001). Even when dropping all observations from H.R. 4841
(2014), which had 43 sponsors, the percentage of Democratic sponsors (70.5 percent) is
statistically significant (t = 2.4861; p = 0.0146). Recalling similar analysis from Chapter 3, the
partisan composition of sponsorship differs significantly between price and quality (t =
5.3326; p < 0.0001), even when dropping observations from H.R. 4841 (2014) (t = 5.1993; p
< 0.0001).

28

These seven bills—H.R. 3230 (2014), H.R. 4841 (2014), S. 2450 (2014), H.R. 2853 (2013), H.R. 4803 (2010),
H.R. 2723 (2007), and S. 1226 (2007)—were found through using the terms “quality,” “transparency,” and
“healthcare” to search ProQuest Congressional Publications. To increase the timeliness of the findings, the
search results were limited to the year 2007 onward.
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Bill identifier

Figure 10: Federal legislation for quality transparency: Partisan sponsorship of
House and Senate bills (chart)
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(Sources for information in chart: Delbanco, 2014; Impulse, 2015)

The trend of Democrats pushing for quality transparency is even more apparent on
the state level. Of 29 pieces of quality transparency legislation passed in 13 states between
1989 and 2013, 63.89 percent passed when state legislatures were a majority Democrats (t =
1.557; p = 0.131), and 65.63 percent passed when the state governor was a Democrat (t =
1.772; p = 0.087) (sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine).
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Figure 11: State legislation for quality transparency: Partisan control of state
legislature and party affiliation of governor when legislation passed (chart)

35%

Democratic
Republican
65%

(Sources of information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine)

The partisan composition of legislatures when transparency legislation passes does
not differ significantly between price and quality (t = 0.349; p = 0.728), nor does the party
affiliation of the governor (t = 0.523; p = 0.601).
4.3 Federal initiatives for quality transparency
The main federal initiative for quality transparency is Medicare Hospital Compare,
which is a website available to the public. Hospital Compare enables patients to compare the
quality of different hospitals (Medicare, 2015a). Hospital Compare has information about the
quality of care at over 4,000 Medicare-certified hospitals (Medicare, 2015c). Similar Medicare
services are Physician Compare, Nursing Home Compare, Home Health Compare, Dialysis
Facility Compare, Medicare Plan Finder, and Supplier Directory (Medicare, 2015a).
Hospital Compare was created through the efforts of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS), in collaboration with organizations representing consumers,
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hospitals, doctors, employers, accrediting organizations, and other Federal agencies
(Medicare, 2015c). Prior to Hospital Compare, the Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA; now CMS) sought to publish nationwide hospital-specific mortality data beginning
in the mid-1980s. The effort was not widely used by consumers and ended in the early
1990s, partly due to criticism for the HCFA’s lack of risk adjustment (Dudley, Rittenhouse,
& Bae, 2002). In 1990, the National Committee for Quality Assurance’s (NCQA) was
founded, and began administering Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set
(HEDIS), which now forms the basis for the NCQA’s accreditation of more than 90% of
America’s health plans through measurement of performance for care and service (NCQA,
2015b). Starting in 1999, the federal government re-entered public reporting with
comparative performance reports for providers that participate in Medicare; these reports
included Health Plan Compare, Nursing Home Compare, Home Health Compare, and
Dialysis Compare (C. o. t. F. o. R. H. Care, 2005).
Medicare Hospital Compare is able to have such thorough data because hospital
reimbursements are tied to reporting. The Hospital Inpatient Quality Reporting program was
originally mandated by Section 501(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, which authorized CMS to pay reporting hospitals a higher
annual update to payment rates, and a lower rate to non-reporters (CMS, 2015c).
In 2005, a consortium of organizations initiated an effort now called the Hospital
Quality Alliance (HQA) to establish a national database to provide information on the
quality of care provided by hospitals (Jha, Li, Orav, & Epstein, 2005). The organizations
involved were CMS, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), the American Hospital Association, and consumer groups such as the American
Association of Retired Persons (Jha et al., 2005). Under the HQA, hospitals nationwide
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report data to CMS on indicators of quality of care for three conditions: acute myocardial
infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia (Jha et al., 2005). HQA data on 10 quality
indicators first became publicly available on November 30, 2004, and were updated on April
1, 2005 (Jha et al., 2005).
Between April 2005 and September 2010, the amount of publicly available
information expanded to include 30-day hospital readmission, mortality rates, patient
experience of their hospital care, steps to prevent surgical infections, and hospital outpatient
measures (AHA, FAH, & AAMC, 2010). Specifically, CMS and the HQA began publicly
reporting 30-day mortality measures for acute myocardial infarction and heart failure in June
2007, and for pneumonia in June 2008, and has since expanded the publicly reported
outcome measures to include 30-day readmission for these conditions, complications and
readmission data for hip/knee replacements, and in-hospital adverse events and mortality
(CMS, 2015d). Its stated rationale is that “publicly reporting these measures increases the
transparency of hospital care, provides useful information for consumers choosing care, and
assists hospitals in their quality improvement efforts” (CMS, 2015d). Using claims and
administrative data, CMS annually calculates the following categories of outcome measures
based on claims and administrative data for public reporting (CMS, 2015d).
Table 3: CMS categories of outcome measures for public reporting
30-day risk-standardized
mortality measures

30-day risk-standardized
readmission measures

AHRQ Patient Safety
Indicators (PSIs)

Acute Myocardial
Infarction

Acute Myocardial
Infarction

Heart Failure

Heart Failure

PSI 04: Death among surgical
inpatients with serious treatable
complications
PSI 90: Composite—
complications/patient safety for
selected indicators

Pneumonia

Pneumonia
Hip/Knee
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The survey of patients’ experience that appears on Hospital Compare comes from
the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) Survey
(CMS, 2015b). The HCAHPS Survey was created by CMS with AHRQ, and is administered
to a random sample of patients continuously throughout the year (CMS, 2015b). Hospitallevel results are publicly reported on Hospital Compare four times a year, and are based on
four quarters of data on a rolling basis (CMS, 2015b).
When Hospital Compare was first rolled out, to initiate the reporting effort, CMS
selected 10 measures of the quality of care that have been widely endorsed and that are
considered valid and feasible for immediate public reporting (Jha et al., 2005). These 10
measures reflect the quality of care for three major clinical conditions: acute myocardial
infarction, congestive heart failure, and pneumonia (Jha et al., 2005). There were five
measures of the quality of care for acute myocardial infarction: the use or nonuse of aspirin
within 24 hours before or after arrival at the hospital and at discharge, the use or nonuse of a
beta-blocker within 24 hours after arrival and at discharge, and the use or nonuse of an
angiotensin-converting–enzyme (ACE) inhibitor for left ventricular systolic dysfunction (Jha
et al., 2005). Two measures were used for congestive heart failure: assessment of left
ventricular function and the use or nonuse of an ACE inhibitor for left ventricular
dysfunction (Jha et al., 2005). Three measures were used for pneumonia: the timing of initial
antibiotic therapy, the presence or absence of pneumococcal vaccination, and assessment of
oxygenation (Jha et al., 2005).
One strategy the government has used to accelerate the implementation of quality
measures has been the linkage of financial incentives to reporting. The Medicare
Modernization Act, passed in 2003, established financial incentives for hospitals to provide
the CMS with data on these 10 indicators of quality (Jha et al., 2005). Much more recently,
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under the Affordable Care Act’s attempt to curb avoidable adverse events in acute care
hospitals, Yale-New Haven Hospital is set to receive 1% lower Medicare reimbursements
between October 2014 and September 15, due to one of the highest rates of hospitalacquired infections in the country (Uchegbu, 2015).
Yet, even this national initiative ran into difficulties in the implementation stage. The
controversy surrounding Hospital Compare speaks to challenges facing transparency
initiatives more broadly. A Quality Advisory sent to hospitals on September 8, 2010 by the
American Hospital Association (AHA), Federation of American Hospitals, and AAMC
stated that information on hospital-acquired conditions (HACs) would be available on
Hospital Compare, and warned that “the release of HAC rates may generate interest from
patients, your community and the media” (AHA et al., 2010). The Advisory also noted that
hospitals would have only 9 days to review their data prior to the data being made available
to the public in a downloadable file on September 23, 2010. The Advisory listed the eight
HACs to be provided—foreign object retained after surgery; air embolism; blood
incompatibility; pressure ulcer stages III and IV; falls and trauma; vascular catheterassociated infection; catheter-associated urinary tract infection; and manifestations of poor
glycemic control—and noted that the data would be available solely via download, rather
than displayed similarly to the rest of the data available on Hospital Compare (AHA et al.,
2010).
The Quality Advisory summarizes the legislative push that led to HACs being
publicly reported. It states that Congress included a provision in the Deficit Reduction Act
(section 5001(c)) to direct the Secretary to begin collecting data on whether complications
were acquired during hospitalization and to stop paying the higher complicated MS-DRG
payment for selected conditions (AHA et al., 2010). The motivation for this provision was a
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concern that the payment system might reward hospitals for substandard care by paying
extra when a patient developed a HAC (AHA et al., 2010).
The timeline established by Section 5001(c) of the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act was
that on October 1, 2007, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would select at least
two hospital-acquired conditions that were high cost, high volume, or both; that would result
in a diagnosis-related grouping with a higher payment if present as a secondary diagnosis;
and that could have reasonably been prevented through the application of evidence-based
guidelines (CMS, 2007). Then, on October 1, 2008, the reimbursement charges based on
hospitals receiving no additional payment from CMS is the hospital-acquired condition was
listed as a secondary diagnosis and if there was no documentation that the condition was
present on admission to the healthcare facility come into effect (CMS, 2007).
A term that appears frequently in the Quality Advisory is “consensus-based entities”
(AHA et al., 2010). Examples of such entities include the National Quality Forum (NQF)
and the HQA (AHA et al., 2010). One concern raised in the Quality Advisory is that CMS
has not released publicly available specifications for the calculation of HAC rates, so they
have not been reviewed by consensus-based entities, which “is an essential step in the quality
measure development process” (AHA et al., 2010).
Another recent controversy surrounding Hospital Compare is that most hospitals are
required to report quality scores, but critical access hospitals can do so voluntarily, resulting
in only one in three critical access hospitals reporting their emergency room quality measures
(Rau, 2014). A critical access hospital is defined as a hospital with no more than 25 beds;
they are usually located in isolated areas, and constitute 25% of hospitals in the US (Rau,
2014). Some states have very few critical access hospitals—Connecticut, Delaware, DC,
Maryland, New Jersey, and Rhode Island have none—while they constitute the majority of
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hospitals in other states (Rau, 2014). For example, 80% of hospitals in North Dakota are
critical access—the highest proportion in any state—followed closely by 76% in Montana,
71% in Nebraska, and 69% in Iowa (Rau, 2014).
From these federal quality transparency examples, we have learned the difficulties of
presenting useful information to consumers without stepping on toes. Let us now turn to
the initiatives that individual states have implemented.
4.4 State initiatives for quality transparency
Different states have taken very different approaches to quality transparency. Their
approaches differ in terms of the measures of quality, the modes of presentation, and the
content presented. This section focuses on cases of states implementing quality transparency
successfully. Their approaches differ based on the measures of quality, the modes of
presentation, and the content presented. As discussed earlier, of 29 pieces of quality
transparency legislation passed in 13 states between 1989 and 2013, 63.89 percent passed
when state legislatures were a majority Democrats (t = 1.557; p = 0.131), and 65.63 percent
passed when the state governor was a Democrat (t = 1.772; p = 0.087) (sources of
information: Delbanco, 2014; NCSL, 2015a; analysis mine).
Example states were selected through a multi-step process. First were isolated those
states that received passing grades on the 2014 State Report Card on Transparency of
Physician Quality Information (HCI3, 2014). The Report Card was released in 2013 and
again in 2014 by the Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute (HCI3, 2014).29 The
report card reviews the (1) state-specific types of quality information on physicians, (2) state29

The Health Care Incentives Improvement Institute is a non-profit that resulted from a merger of Bridges to
Excellence (programs to reward healthcare practitioners who meet certain performance measures) and
PROMETHEUS Payment (a compensation approach based on medical episodes of care), and aims to improve
health care quality and value with evidence-based incentive programs and a fair and powerful model for
payment reform (HCI3, 2015).
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specific amount of publicly available quality information on physicians and clinicians, and (3)
how recent the state-specific quality information is (HCI3, 2014). The grading criteria can be
viewed in the report. The report leveraged the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation’s national
directory of public web-based resources available in each state (HCI3, 2014). Only ten states
received passing grades: California, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin (HCI3, 2014).
Next, those states were cross-referenced with the NCQA list of 39 states requiring
the use of HEDIS/CAHPS for both Medicaid and commercial managed care (NCQA,
2015a). NCQA’s HEDIS Compliance Audit process is consistent with the CMS protocol for
validating performance measures. Many states, the federal government (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services and the Office of Personnel Management), and other purchasers use
HEDIS measures for quality improvement, benchmarking and pay for performance
(NCQA, 2015a). Using the NCQA website listing enabled states that had scored poorly on
the Report Card to nonetheless be considered for their alternate efforts.

Table 4: Criteria for quality transparency case selection
1. 2014 State report card on

Criteria
Did the state’s quality
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Successful states
California

transparency of physician
quality information

transparency receive a
passing grade in 2014?

2. NCQA list of 39 states
requiring the use of
HEDIS/CAHPS

Does the state currently
requiring the use of
HEDIS/CAHPS for both
commercial managed care
and Medicaid

Maine
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri
New Mexico
Ohio
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin
California
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Indiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Missouri
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Rhode Island
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington
Wisconsin

(HCI3, 2014) (NCQA, 2015a)
From those states, I focused on Maryland and Wisconsin. Maryland offers a Patient
Guide, designed to help patients compare hospitals based on quality. Wisconsin’s healthcare
quality website has been offering comparison information to consumers since 2005.

Table 5: Criteria for quality transparency case evaluation
Criteria
1. User-friendliness of quality Is quality information
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State(s) meeting the criteria
Maryland

measures

specific enough for
consumers to infer how
safe their own treatment
will be, by providing:
(c) Multiple metrics for
different measures,
such as hospitalacquired infections
in addition to
readmission rates?
(d) Procedure-specific
in addition to or
instead of overall
hospital data?
2. User-friendliness of
Does the website tailor
website
information to the
consumer’s specific needs
through interactivity by:
(c) Allowing
comparison of
specific hospitals?
(d) Allowing searching
by condition or
treatment?
3. Completeness of
Is information available:
information
(e) On any given
procedure?
(f) On all relevant
providers?
(g) For all recent years?
4. Estimated website traffic
If available, does it indicate
significant usage?
(HCI3, 2014) (NCQA, 2015a)

Maryland

Maryland

4.4.1 Maryland
Maryland offers a Patient Guide, designed to help patients compare hospitals based
on quality. The website provides information designed to help patients select a hospital that
provides a high level of care for a given medical condition, and understand how often
hospitals perform recommended treatments for selected medical conditions (Guide, 2012).
User-friendliness of Maryland’s quality measures and website
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The Maryland Hospital Association website allows patients to sort by condition and
see how each hospital performs on multiple sets of quality measures for that condition.

Figure 12: Maryland Health Care Quality Reports (screenshot)

Completeness of information on Maryland’s website
The Maryland Hospital Performance Evaluation Guide contains information from
several sources (Guide, 2012). Information on the number of patients treated for a medical
condition, how long they stayed in the hospital, and how many of them were readmitted to
the hospital for the same condition comes from the Maryland Health Services Cost Review
Commission (HSCRC) and from Washington, D.C. hospitals.
Another source of information included is hospital profile information, such as
licensed bed counts and neonatal intensive care unit levels, which comes from the Maryland
Health Care Commission (MHCC). Also included is information on quality measures and
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services offered directly from the hospitals, as well as information on patient readmissions
and transfers from Maryland hospitals to healthcare facilities in the District of Columbia,
which comes from Washington, D.C. hospitals.
These performance measures have developed over time, developing from listing only
Heart Attack, Heart Failure, Pneumonia, and Surgical Infection Prevention in June 2007 to
listing Heart Attack, Heart Failure, Pneumonia, Surgical Care, Patient Satisfaction, Children’s
Asthma, Medical Imaging, Emergency Department Care, Preventative Care, Healthcare
Associated Infections, Stroke Care, Blood Clot Prevention, and 30-Day Outcomes as of
January 2015.
Figure 13: Maryland Health Care Quality Reports: Summary of Hospital Information
(screenshot)

4.4.2 Wisconsin
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Wisconsin’s healthcare quality website has been offering comparison information to
consumers since 2005. In 2004, through the support of WEA Trust, WCHQ released an
interactive Performance & Progress Report. This web-based report allows any individual to
access relevant, audited healthcare quality information, while comparing a choice of
healthcare providers and performance measures.

User-friendliness of Wisconsin’s quality measures
Wisconsin’s quality measures are not user-friendly. While WCHQ provides multiple
metrics for different measures, such as hospital-acquired infections in addition to
readmission rates, and it does provide procedure-specific data, it presents these metrics in
ways that are not accessible to the average consumer. For example, see Figure 14, which has
all the important information there for someone to know how statistically rigorous the data
is—but does not do enough work for the consumer to help her draw conclusions about
what this means for her own treatment.
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Figure 14: WCHQ CABG deep sternal wound infection (screenshot)

User-friendliness of Wisconsin’s website
To some degree, the website tailors information to the consumer’s specific needs
through interactivity. It allows comparison of specific hospitals, and allows searching by
some categories of treatment. But as Figure 9 shows, the results cater too much to a
statistician and not enough to a woman who is just trying to figure out where to go for her
mammogram.
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Figure 15: WCHQ breast cancer screening (screenshot)

Completeness of information on Wisconsin’s website
Although information is available for certain procedures, providers, and years, it was
very difficult to find any data on certain hospitals and conditions. For example, if I want to
know which hospital will be best for my kidney disease management, the results from
WCHQ presented in Figure 10 will be very little help.
Figure 16: WCHQ Measures Summary (screenshot)
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4.5 Private initiatives for quality transparency
Private initiatives for quality transparency include the U.S. News and World Report
rankings of hospitals, which are available on the website and in print. Another is by the Joint
Commission, a national nonprofit that administers the website qualitycheck.org. Another is
the Leapfrog Group, a national organization that makes hospital quality measures available
on leapfroggroup.org. Further private initiatives include Healthgrades, a national
organization that produces healthgrades.com, and the Michigan Hospital Association
Keystone Center, which also administers a website.
Major hospital quality reporting organizations include the Consumer Assessment of
Health Professionals and Systems; The Joint Commission; The National Quality Forum;
National Quality Measures Clearinghouse; Aligning Forces for Quality; and
CalQualityCare.org (run by the California Healthcare Foundation). In December 2003, the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) released the first NHQR, which
included quality measures for the nation (C. o. t. F. o. R. H. Care, 2005). In 2006, AHRQ
released a web-based tool called State Snapshots (NCQA, 2007). State Snapshots ranked
each state on 15 measures of healthcare quality and showed each state’s relative performance
(NCQA, 2007).
In June 2001, the Leapfrog Group began requesting information from hospitals on
three safety practices (use of computerized physician order entry, evidence-based hospital
referral, and staffing of intensive care units with doctors who have specialized critical care
training), then in April 2004 added thirty safe practices identified by the National Quality
Forum (C. o. t. F. o. R. H. Care, 2005).
4.5.1 CalQualityCare
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CalQualityCare is managed by the California HealthCare Foundation (CHCF), a
nonprofit group dedicated to improving the value of healthcare in California (Foundation,
2015). CHCF has multiple partners to provide the information on the website, namely the
California Hospitals Assessment and Reporting Taskforce,30 California Healthcare
Performance Information System,31 Consumer Reports Health,32 Truven Health Analytics,33
and the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the University of California, San
Francisco. In 2002, CHCF began publishing online ratings of nursing homes; in 2004, it
added similar ratings of home health care agencies and hospice services; then, in 2005, it
incorporated congregate living health facilities, assisted living, continuing care retirement
communities, adult healthcare programs, and adult day care centers. In 2007, CHCF began
aggregating data from voluntarily participating hospitals and insurers

User-friendliness of CalQualityCare’s quality measures
The quality information on CalQualityCare is specific enough for consumers to infer
how safe their own treatment will be. It provides multiple metrics for different measures,
such as hospital-acquired infections in addition to readmission rates. It also provides
procedure-specific in addition to or instead of overall hospital data (Foundation, 2015). The
conditions and procedures rated are among the most common reasons for being admitted to
a hospital (Foundation, 2015).
30

The California Hospital Assessment and Reporting Task Force has received in-kind and financial support
from over 200 California hospitals, the California Health Care Foundation, and every California health plan
with at least 3% market share (Dudley, 2015).
31 The California Healthcare Performance Information System (CHPI) is a 501(c)(4) nonprofit, public benefit
corporation. CHPI is building a healthcare database with the healthcare experiences of more than 12 million
people from health plans and Medicare to evaluate the quality and efficiency of medical services (CHPI, 2015).
32 Consumer Reports is a nonprofit organization that works toward a “fair, just, and safe marketplace for all
consumers” (Reports, 2015).
33 Truven Health Analytics contracts with hospitals, physicians, pharmacists, employers, health plans,
government agencies, pharmaceutical companies, researchers, and policymakers to provide healthcare data and
analytics (Truven, 2015).
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The quality measures depend on which federal or state agency the data comes from.
From CMS Hospital Compare comes data on patient experience, patient safety, heart attack,
heart failure, lung conditions and pneumonia, and emergency department care (Foundation,
2015). From California CABG Outcomes Reporting Program and California OSHPD comes
heart bypass surgery (Foundation, 2015). From the California OSHPD also comes surgeries
and other conditions. From the California Department of Public Health comes the
breastfeeding rate (Foundation, 2015). From the California Maternal Quality Care
Collaborative come all other mother and baby measures (Foundation, 2015).
User-friendliness of CalQualityCare’s website
CalQualityCare tailors information to the consumer’s specific needs through
interactivity. It allows comparison of specific hospitals. To some degree, it allows searching
by condition or treatment, but in a very limited way: heart attack, heart bypass surgery, heart
failure, mother and baby, and lung conditions are the only possibilities (Foundation, 2015).
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Figure 17: CalQualityCare (screenshot)

Completeness of information on CalQualityCare’s website
CalQualityCare does not have information on all procedures, nor on all providers,
nor for all recent years. It includes hospital measures for clinical care, patient safety, and
patient experience for all acute care hospitals in the state of California with publicly available
information (Foundation, 2015). This represents 332 hospitals, and does not include
psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, long-term acute care hospitals and specialty only
hospitals (Foundation, 2015). Some small, rural, or Critical Access Hospitals do not have
publically available data or a sufficient amount of data to score them accurately (Foundation,
2015). Measures of children’s health care are not included nor widely available (Foundation,
2015).
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4.6 Chapter conclusion
This chapter has presented the current state of affairs for quality transparency in the
U.S. hospital market, showing the degree of variability between initiatives. It bears clarifying
that a hospital can have a high mortality rate for a procedure and still provide high quality
care—a hospital could be very good and as a result get the hardest cases. For this reason,
predicting the behavior of healthcare market participants according to bounded rationality is
particularly important, as not all consumers will understand the implications of mortality
ratings for their own circumstances.
While this chapter’s discussion showed the importance of different quality measures
in providing an accurate picture of how good a hospital is, Chapter 5 will delve into the
difference between perceived and actual quality.
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Chapter 5 Findings and analysis

A 2015 New York Times article34 features Harvard’s Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
Center in Boston,35 Yale-New Haven Hospital,36 the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research
Center in Seattle,37 University of Utah hospital,38 and Stanford Health Care.39 The article cites
examples of patient surveys triggering hospital improvements, especially relating to process.
For instance, one survey revealed that patients felt unable to get a good night’s sleep without
interruption, so Dr. Michael Bennick (medical director for patient experience at Yale-New
Haven Hospital) required any 4 a.m.-blood draw to be accompanied by a phone call to him.
Middle-of-the-night blood draws stopped.
***

34

“Doctors strive to do less harm by inattentive care,” reads a New York Times headline from February 18,
2015.
35 Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center appeared on 84 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists
between 2001 and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology,
geriatrics, gynecology, cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, and rheumatology (USNWR et al.,
2015).
36 Yale-New Haven Hospital appeared on 150 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists between 2001
and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology, ear nose and throat,
geriatrics, gynecology, cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, urology, and rheumatology
(USNWR et al., 2015).
37 The Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center did not appear on any U.S. News and World Report “Best
Hospital” lists between 2001 and 2014 (USNWR et al., 2015).
38 The University of Utah Hospital appeared on 18 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists between
2002 and 2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gynecology, and orthopedics
(USNWR et al., 2015).
39 Stanford Health Care appeared on 181 U.S. News and World Report “Best Hospital” lists between 2001 and
2014, for its performance in various specialties including: oncology, gastroenterology, geriatrics, gynecology,
cardiology, endocrinology, nephrology, orthopedics, and rheumatology (USNWR et al., 2015).
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Chapters 3 and 4 discussed implementation of price and quality transparency. In
Chapter 5, I shift focus to connect price and quality transparency implementation to its
efficacy. Patient surveys, which have been rolled out nationwide by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, prompt both supply-side and demand-side change. They promote
supply-side change by motivating hospitals to change their internal policies. They facilitate
demand-side change by enabling consumers to make decisions about which hospital to select
based on survey results about it.
In this chapter, I juxtapose the longstanding and widespread perspective that
transparency ought to be promoted with the reality that transparency is very difficult to do
right. President Bush’s healthcare policies are emblematic of the view that healthcare in
transparency is good because it makes intuitive sense. On August 22, 2006, President Bush
signed an Executive Order to increase the transparency of the healthcare system in the U.S.
(House, 2006). The Executive Order directed federal agencies that administered or
sponsored federal health insurance programs to increase transparency in pricing, increase
transparency in quality, encourage adoption of health information technology standards, and
provide options that promote quality and efficiency in healthcare (House, 2006). The
Executive Order stipulated that, “To spend their healthcare dollars wisely, Americans need
to know their options in advance, know the quality of doctors and hospitals in their area, and
know what procedures will cost. When Americans buy new cars, they have access to
consumer research on safety, reliability, price, and performance—and they should be able to
expect the same when they purchase healthcare” (NCQA, 2007).
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The reality of implementation did not live up to Bush’s vision in the Executive
Order. In 2007, four federal agencies40 published the “Progress Report on Implementation
of Executive Order 13410 ‘Promoting Quality and Efficient Health Care in Federal
Government Administered or Sponsored Health Care Programs’” (Services et al., 2007). The
Progress Report highlighted certain steps taken, including CMS adding two mortality
measures for heart attack and heart failure to Hospital Compare in June 2007, OPM
contracting with Web-MD to conduct a pilot project (deployed prior to November 2007)
with three Federal agencies in the DC area to determine how employees use provider price
and quality information, and the VA adopting a set of standards from the Ambulatory Care
Quality Alliance (AQA) and coordinating the testing of the quality standards with the
Department of Defense (DoD) and Indian Health Services (IHS).
Yet, the U.S. has not done much in the eight years following President Bush’s
Executive Order. The previous chapter presented the current state of affairs for price and
quality transparency in the U.S. hospital market, and showed that the developments have
been relatively recent. This chapter analyzes the usefulness of current information available
to consumers, demonstrating that recent reforms have not gone far enough to prompt the
demand-driven improvements in healthcare delivery they sought to achieve.

40

The agencies that published the progress report were the Department of Health and Human Services, the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Veterans Affairs
(Services, Management, Defense, & Affairs, 2007). From the Department of Health and Human Services were
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology (ONC), the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and the Indian
Health Services (IHS) (Services et al., 2007).
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Price and quality transparency can only facilitate change insofar as healthcare
consumers effectively use the information it makes available. Yet, federal, state, and private
websites provide information on hospital price and quality in different ways, including
different measures of each. These discrepancies may lead consumers to make suboptimal
decisions.
Therefore, I designed and administered surveys to quantify the extent to which
discrepancies between websites impact consumer decisions. Four surveys were administered
in total. Each survey had a section on price and one on quality. The survey respondents were
choosing between two hospitals with obvious differences for utility maximization.
Specifically, when deciding on the basis of price, the least expensive hospital, ceteris paribus,
would maximize utility. Likewise, the highest quality hospital was assumed to maximize
utility.
Survey 1, which had versions (a) and (b), explored how consumers make healthcare
decisions based on available information as it is currently presented to the public. This was
achieved by taking screenshots of the information on two hospitals from two different
hospital price and quality websites.41,42 Including screenshots of websites was intended to
simulate the process by which consumers would access information on their own when
preparing to make a real life healthcare decision. Beyond conveying the price information

41

For price, one of the websites searched was OpsCost, a privately run website that makes public data more
accessible and helps individuals share their healthcare bills. The other website searched was My Health Care
Options, which is administered by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
42 For quality, one of the websites searched was U.S. News Best Hospitals, a privately run website that releases
rankings every year by specialty. The other website searched was Medicare Hospital Compare, which is
administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
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itself, using screenshots retained the visual presentation of information of each website and
the amount of information presented. In contrast, survey 2, which had versions (a) and (b),
extracted price and quality information from the same websites and presented it in table
form. Survey 2 sought to isolate the effect of the information itself from its presentation.
In section 5.1, I discuss the usefulness of price information currently available to the
public; section 5.2 focuses on quality information. In section 5.2, I present findings from the
U.S. News Best Hospital rankings for the years 2001 through 2014. In both sections, I
present survey results that show consumers having varying degrees of difficulty in choosing
the higher quality or lower cost option. The key finding from the surveys was that people are
significantly more likely to make the right choice if they are not told where data comes from,
and if information overload is reduced by non-graphical image presentation.

5.1 Usefulness of price-paid information currently available to the public
The usefulness of price-paid information to consumers depends on a few factors,
including (1) the consumer’s desire for price information, and (2) the information presented
alongside price-paid information. Price transparency matters more to some consumers than
to others. Those with especially strong incentives to choose lower-priced healthcare include
those who are directly responsible for payment, such as the uninsured or those on highdeductible plans (Delbanco, 2014). There is a common misperception that a provider that
costs more administers better quality, leading consumers to gravitate toward high cost
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providers (Delbanco, 2014). As a result, it can be useful to present quality and price
information together, to paint a picture of the value of care given by a provider. Certain
desired features for the display of price and quality indicators include simple language,
contextual information (such as “below average”), and limited information presented initially
(with drill-downs possible) to prevent cognitive overload (Delbanco, 2014).
5.1.1 Survey: price transparency
The driving question of this thesis is: to what extent can and should patients in the
US use price and quality information to choose hospitals in order to improve healthcare
value in the market? Thus far, I have written about and evaluated efforts to promote
transparency. But it is also necessary to ground my analysis of these current efforts in a
broader assessment of how people currently make and would make healthcare decisions,
given materials presently available. As a result, I developed and administered two survey
experiments to determine the impact of information provided and the presentation of that
information on enabling better decision-making. In this section, I present the sections of the
surveys that pertain to price transparency. Section 5.2.2 presents those for quality
transparency.
What is meant by good decision-making here comes from Chapter 2, which argued
that healthcare consumers are best understood through the lens of bounded rationality.
Decision-making in this context is good insofar as means that higher quality and lower cost
healthcare is consumed.
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Therefore, the first survey addressed the ability of everyday consumers to make
healthcare decisions based on currently available information as it is presented to the public.
This was achieved by taking screenshots of the information on two hospitals from two
different hospital price websites. The two hospitals were Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
Center and Massachusetts General Hospital, both located in Boston. The hospitals were
chosen partly because of the existence of the Massachusetts My Health Care Options, which
provides hospital price and quality data. They were also chosen because they are in close
proximity to each other, which should reduce the effect of distance on the consumer
decision. Finally, both hospitals appeared frequently on the U.S. News Best Hospital list, so
it was hoped that any name-based reputational effects would be diminished.
The first survey consisted of versions 1(a) and 1(b) to allow comparison of consumer
decisions when presented with different websites providing information on the same
hospitals. Survey 1(a) used screenshots of My Health Care Options, which is administered by
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Survey 1(b) presented screenshots of OpsCost, a
privately run website that makes public data more accessible and helps individuals share their
healthcare bills.
Table 1 provides a summary of both surveys and their versions. The results of
Survey 1 showed that everyday consumers had difficulty making optimal healthcare decisions
based on available information as it is currently presented to the public. The results of
Survey 2 showed that the metrics chosen to present healthcare pricing information lead
consumers to different, sometimes suboptimal, decisions. The first survey was administered
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February 17 through February 22nd, 2015, and paid respondents $0.04 per survey. The
second survey was administered from March 18 through March 22, 2015, and paid
respondents $0.10 per survey. Because the second survey was administered after the first
survey, it also refined some of the preliminary questions based on how well they elicited
answers in the first survey. For all the survey questions, Survey 2(a) can be found in full in
the Appendix.

Figure 18: Summary of surveys 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b) for price transparency

Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Massachusetts General Hospital

Hospitals shown
Internet source of
price information
Information
presentation

My Health Care
Options
(Massachusetts)
Survey 1(a)
Screenshots
of website

Survey 2(a)
Tables

OpsCost

Survey 1(a)
Screenshots
of website

Survey 2(a)
Tables

Respondents were provided with some background information on the website, as
demonstrated in Figure 1. For example, as shown in Figure 1, Survey 1(a) described My
Health Care Options as a website run by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Health Care
Quality and Cost Council.
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Figure 19: Excerpt from Survey 1(a): Price information from My Health Care Options
(screenshot)
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Survey 1(b) included the same instructions as Survey 1(a), but presented information
from OpsCost instead of from My Health Care Options, as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 20: Excerpt from Survey 1(b): Price information from OpsCost (screenshot)

As is clear from both figures, there are multiple ways to provide context about price
information. OpsCost allows the consumer to compare prices among nearby hospitals, while
My Health Care Options does the comparison on a more aggregate level for the consumer
(“Not Different from Median State Cost”). But it is also clear from the figures that the same
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information can be presented in different ways, which may have implications for consumer
decisions.
As a result, the second survey decoupled website information from its presentation.
The aim of the second survey was to show that healthcare pricing information, with sources
choosing different metrics, could be complicated and sometimes misleading. This could lead
consumers to make suboptimal decisions, independent of differences in presentation.
Survey versions 2(a) and 2(b) extracted price information respectively from My
Health Care Options and OpsCost and presented it in table form. The second survey
anonymized the websites, terming My Health Care Compare “a state-run website” and
OpsCost “a privately-run website.” In Survey 2, the hospitals, too, are anonymized to
eliminate reputational effects, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 21:: Excerpt from Survey 2(a): Price information from My Health Care Options
(extracted)

The hospitals were referred to as “Hospital A” and “Hospital B,” but had almost
the exact same information as th
thee real hospitals. No numbers were altered for the price data
from My Health Care Options, depicted in Figure 3. However, the price information was
adjusted slightly for Survey 2(b) to make the better choice more clear. Specifically, OpsCost
provides both billed and reimbursed amounts for a procedure. Massachusetts General
Hospital was more expensive for the billed amount, but Beth Israel Deaconess Medical
Center was more expensive for the reimbursed amount. Survey 2 removes the ambiguity
resulting
ulting from this by making “Hospital B” (Massachusetts General Hospital) more
expensive for both
th billed and reimbursed amount, as shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 22:: Excerpt from Survey 2(b): Price information from OpsCost (extracted)

The surveys were built in Qualtrics, which is web-based
based software that enables survey
creation. The surveys were administered through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk for
short), an
n online labor market where requesters post jobs and workers choose which jobs to
do for pay (Amazon, 2015). Numerous studies have shown correspondence between the
behavior of workers on Mechanical Turk and behavior offline,43 which makes it a suitable
means of gathering respondents for this small
small-scale survey.
As Table 2 shows, 224 respondents w
were
ere surveyed total. Survey 1 had 122
respondents, while Survey 2 had 102 respondents. Across both surveys, respondents were
young (the median age was 30
30), educated (the
the average highest education level achieved was a
bachelors
lors degree), making ends meet ((the average household income was $40,000-$49,999),
$40,000
settling down (50 percent were married
married), religious (aa plurality of respondents practice

43

Mason and Suri (2011) compare the beha
behavior
vior of Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to that of laboratory
subjects, showing that the norm on Mechanical Turk of paying less than one would typically pay laboratory
subjects should not impact large classes of experiments (Mason & Suri, 2011).. Mason and Suri (2011) also
highlight three benefits of using Mechanical Turk to run online experiments: (1) subject pool access, (2) subject
pool diversity, and (3) low cost (Mason
Mason & Suri, 2011
2011).. Paolacci and Chandler (2010) found only slight
differences between the results from Mechanical Turk and ssubjects
ubjects recruited from the subject pool at a large
Midwestern university (Paolacci,
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010
2010). Berinsky et al. (2012) show
w that MTurk
respondents are often more representative of the U.S. population than in
in-person
person convenience samples, but less
representative than subjects in Internet
Internet-based panels or national probability samples (Berinsky,
Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz,
2012).. Buhrmester et al. (2011) show that for tasks that rely on subjective responses (as is the case with my
surveys), there is no relationship between pay rates and the quality of data gleaned from MTurk (Buhrmester,
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).
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Christianity), and leaning toward the left (a plurality were Democrats). On average, it took
six minutes to respond to the surveys.

Table 6: Participant information across Surveys 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b)
Gender
Age
Education
Financial security
Relationship status
Religion
Political affiliation

Familiarity with
process and
subject matter

Familiarity with
existing resources

N
Female
Male
Age (mean)
Age (median)
Highest achieved education level (mean)
Annual household income (mean)
Covered by health insurance
Single
Married
Practices Christianity
Practices Hinduism
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Other
Ever used online reviews to decide
whether to purchase something (e.g.,
Amazon reviews for a cell phone)
Ever used online reviews of a hospital to
decide where to receive care
Ever researched prices to decide where
to receive medical care
Immediate family member/close friend
employed in healthcare
Mean perceived comfort navigating the
healthcare system (scale of 1 to 100, with
100 = perfect comfort)
Saw a doctor in the past year
Hospital Compare
Leapfrog Group
U.S. News Best Hospitals
Patient Guide (Maryland)
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224
51%
49%
34 years
30 years
Bachelors degree
$40,000-$49,999
82%
40%
50%
37%
27%
24%
38%
31%
6%
91%
38%
51%
51%
67/100
84%
28%
17%
56%
20%

Survey logistics

My Health Care Options (Massachusetts)
Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare
Quality
The Joint Commission
Healthgrades
Michigan Hospital Association Keystone
Center
Hospital Provider Charge and Actual
Payment Data (Medicare)
Colorado All-Payer Claims Database
New Hampshire Health Cost
Montana Hospital Association
PricePoint
Oregon Association of Hospitals and
Health Systems PricePoint
Time to complete survey (mean)

16%
16%
26%
35%
23%
22%
15%
17%
19%
18%
6 minutes

Price transparency survey: Do respondents choose the less expensive option?
For Survey 1(a), 55 respondents made decisions based on price information on Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts General Hospital. They were shown
price information from My Health Care Options, the Massachusetts-run website. The
cheaper choice was Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. Respondents were asked to
assume that the hospitals were of equal quality.
In response to Survey 1(a), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest choice,
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (39 respondents, constituting 70.91% of the sample).
A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(a) to determine whether this
figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the cheapest
hospital was determined to be statistically significant at a confidence level of 99% (t =
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3.3813, p = 0.0014). More people selected Beth Israel Deaconess than the null hypothesis of
an even distribution could accommodate.
For Survey 1(b), 53 respondents were presented with price information on Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts General Hospital through OpsCost.
The cheapest choice at first appeared unclear. Massachusetts General Hospital was more
expensive for the billed amount, but Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center was more
expensive for the reimbursed amount. Yet, respondents were instructed to assume that they
would be paying out of pocket for their care, so they ought to have made their decision on
the basis of the billed amount. The cheapest decision would be to attend Beth Israel
Deaconess. Instead, there was evident confusion: one respondent selected Massachusetts
General because “Massachusetts General is world renowned”; another noted, “I would want
to know what Mass Gen patients are getting for the extra $$$ (more luxury?).” As a result,
the instructions of the parameters for the decision were made more explicit for Survey 2 (see
Figure 22).
In response to Survey 1(b), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest option,
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (31 respondents, constituting 58.49% of the sample).
A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(b) to determine whether this
figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the cheapest
hospital was not statistically significant at a confidence level of 95% (t = 1.2438, p = 0.2192).
An assumption of even distribution could accommodate the number of people that selected
the cheapest option.

100

Analysis of the survey results focused on whether respondents selected the hospital
with the lowest price. As we can see in Table 7, the information presented in Survey 1(a) was
only slightly better than Survey 1(b) at leading consumers to choose Beth Israel Deaconess.
The difference was not large enough to be statistically significant at p < .05 (t = 1.3499, p =
.1799).

Table 7: Surveys 1(a) and 1(b) for price: Results of two-tailed Student t-test
1(a)
1(b)
Cheapest choice 39 (71%)
31 (58%)
N
55
53
† nonsignificant at the 0.05 probability level.

Difference
8 (13%)†

Now let us move on to Survey 2. For Survey 2(a), 52 respondents made decisions
based on price information on Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts
General Hospital. They were shown price information extracted from My Health Care
Options, the Massachusetts-run website, and presented in table format (see Figure 3). The
better choice was Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, because it was shown to be lower
cost than Massachusetts General. Respondents were asked to assume that the hospitals were
of equal quality.
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In response to Survey 2(a), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest option,
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, disguised as Hospital A (48 respondents, constituting
92.31% of the sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 2(a) to
determine whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents
choosing the cheapest hospital was statistically significant at a confidence level of 99.99% (t
= 11.3352, p < .00001). An assumption of even distribution could not accommodate the
number of people that selected the cheapest option.
For Survey 2(b), 50 respondents were presented with price information on Beth
Israel Deaconess Medical Center and Massachusetts General Hospital extracted from
OpsCost. The cheaper choice was made especially clear through the fudging of numbers,
which made Massachusetts General Hospital appear more expensive for both the billed and
reimbursed amounts.
In response to Survey 2(b), a majority of respondents selected the cheapest option,
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, disguised as Hospital A (44 respondents, constituting
88.00% of the sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 2(b) to
determine whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents
choosing the cheapest hospital was statistically significant at a confidence level of 99.99% (t
= 8.1846, p < .00001). An assumption of even distribution could not accommodate the
number of people that selected the cheapest option.
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Table 8: Surveys 2(a) and 2(b) for price: Results of two-tailed Student t-test
2(a)
2(b)
Cheapest choice 48 (92%)
44 (88%)
N
52
50
† Nonsignificant at the 0.05 probability level.

Difference
4 (4%)†

As we can see in Table 8, the materials in Survey 2(a) were only slightly better than
those in Survey 2(b) at leading consumers to choose Beth Israel Deaconess. The difference
was not large enough to be statistically significant (t = 0.7261, p = .4695).

Table 9: Surveys 1 and 2 for price: Results of two-tailed Student t-test
Cheapest choice
N
***p < .001

1(a&b)
73 (65%)
108

2(a&b)
92 (90%)
102

Difference
19 (25%)***

As shown in Table 9, respondents to Survey 2 outperformed Survey 1 by a
statistically significant amount. The relative performance of respondents to Survey 1 and
Survey 2 shows that consumers are significantly more likely to make the better decision
when relevant information is presented in straightforward ways (t = 4.5705; p < 0.00001).

Price transparency survey: Who was more likely to choose the less expensive option?
Analysis of the survey results first focused on whether respondents selected the
hospital with the lowest price. Secondary analysis showed that propensity to make the
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optimal decision was not predicted by any particular factors, as collected by demographic
and other informational questions in the surveys.
Examining political affiliation across all surveys, one sees that Republicans were no
more likely than those of any other political affiliation to choose the cheapest option at a
confidence level of 95% (t = -0.1294; p = 0.5). Of respondents, 76.47% of Republicans (n =
51) and 77.36% of non-Republicans (n = 159) selected the cheapest option.
Examining gender across all surveys, women were no more likely than men to
choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 1.9418; p = 0.5). 82.57% of
female respondents (n = 109) and 71.29% of male respondents (n = 101) selected the
cheapest option. (For gender, none of the respondents to the surveys identified as “other.”)
For education, those with graduate degrees (JD, MBA, MPH, Ph.D., or other) were
no more likely than those without to choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of
95% (t = -0.8429; p = 0.5). Across all of the surveys, 72.34% of those with graduate degrees
(n = 47) and 78.53% of those without graduate degrees (n = 163) selected the cheapest
option.
Those with higher household incomes were statistically no more likely than those
without to choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 2.5042; p = 0.5).
Across all of the surveys, 87.10% of those with annual household incomes equal to or
greater than $60,000 (n = 62) and 72.97% of those with annual household incomes less than
$60,000 (n = 148) selected the cheapest option.
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Those employed in healthcare were not statistically more likely to choose the
cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% for a single-tailed t-test (t = 0.9183; p =
0.1847). Specifically, those employed in healthcare were considered to be those with
occupations listed as: health diagnosis or treating practitioners and technical occupations;
health care support; and health technologists or technicians. Across all of the surveys,
86.67% of those employed in healthcare (n = 15) and 76.41% of those not employed in
healthcare (n = 195) selected the cheaper option.
Those with family or friends employed in healthcare were not statistically more likely
to choose the cheapest option at a confidence level of 95% (t = -2.6594; p = 0.5). Across all
of the surveys, 69.52% of those with family or close friends employed in healthcare (n =
105) and 84.76% of those without (n = 105) selected the cheaper option. (Respondents who
declined to answer the question about having a family member or close friend employed in
healthcare were counted as not having close friends or family members employed in
healthcare.)
In this section, I have presented the results of the survey pertaining to price
transparency. Recent reforms produced information that is useful to consumers, but has not
required the presentation of that information in ways that would facilitate demand-driven
improvements. In the next section, I show that the same holds true for quality transparency.
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5.2 Usefulness of quality information currently available to the public
In this section, I evaluate the usefulness of quality information currently available to
the public. I focus on two websites in particular: U.S. News Best Hospitals and Medicare
Hospital Compare. These websites cater to consumers in fundamentally different ways. U.S.
News Best Hospitals tries to make decisions for the consumers. It allows regional searching
by treatment type, and the results show up in rank order, best to worst. In contrast, Hospital
Compare tries not to pick favorites: it allows for regional searching, but not by treatment
type, and provides results in alphabetical order. It also has a direct compare feature,
encouraging consumers to actively make decisions.
5.2.1 U.S. News and World Report rankings, 2001-2014
Any discussion of quality transparency would be remiss without analysis of the U.S.
News and World Report rankings. The U.S. News Best Hospitals are a good proxy for
information regarding quality that is available to the consumer. They are available online for
free, and are used frequently in hospital advertisements. The survey showed that 56 percent
of respondents were familiar with the rankings.
Analysis of the rankings reveals significant differences between hospitals that are
ranked by U.S. News and World Report and those that are not. Ranked hospitals are more
likely to be found in wealthy, highly populated areas, with a high percentage of health

106

insurance coverage. Ranked hospitals are less likely to be the sole community provider, are
more likely to be affiliated with a medical school, and see more patients every day.
In terms of methodology, to perform this analysis, data was merged onto the U.S.
News-ranked hospitals dataset from the census and from the American Hospital
Association. AHA data was available for 2000-2011, and was merged on via encoded
hospital identifiers. The census data came in two datasets—SAHIE, with population
insurance estimates, and SAIPE, with income and poverty estimates—and was available for
2008 through 2011. Both datasets were merged using FIPS codes. Despite the year
limitations for the census data, the hospitals marked as “ranked” by U.S. News in that
dataset were ranked at any point between 2001 and 2014. The full list was retained because
so few hospitals are ranked each year, and wanted to determine more about the types of
hospitals that get onto the U.S. News Best Hospital list, not just which hospitals were on the
list for which particular years. The comparison of U.S. News-ranked hospitals and Medicare
Hospital Compare was limited to the year 2011. The non-encrypted U.S. News data was
used, and Hospital Compare 2011 readmissions and mortality index was compressed, to
average score. Any average score of “better than national average” coming from the 6
measures was counted. The data was matched by STATA and then by hand.
To determine the volatility of the U.S. News rankings, a variable that marked the first
time each hospital appeared on the list, and then each time it reappeared on the list after
dropping off. Each hospital had a listing per year, which either said “listed” or “not”, and
counted the number of times listed per year (i.e., if appearing on lists for both cardiology and
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gastroenterology, had a count of 2 for that hospital for that year). This showed that it is
easier to leave the list than to get on (or back on) it. However, there were years with
incomplete information—2011 and 2013—and pediatrics stopped being included and
became its own separate ranking after 2001, but hospitals ranked on the separate pediatrics
list are not included.

Table 10: U.S. News-ranked hospitals by year, with inflow and outflow to show
volatility

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Mean N

Hospitals
ranked by
U.S.
News
167
189
186
159
159
159
170
166
158
155
128
149.67

Entering
the list (%
of ranked
hospitals)
58 (30.69%)
30 (16.13%)
13 (8.18%)
13 (8.18%)
14 (8.81%)
28 (16.47%)
6 (3.61%)
17 (10.76%)
11 (7.01%)
0 (0.00%)
19 (10.98%)

Leaving
the list (%
of ranked
hospitals)
23 (13.77%)
23 (12.17%)
24 (12.90%)
13 (8.18%)
13 (8.18%)
26 (16.35%)
19 (11.18%)
28 (16.87%)
36 (22.78%)
33 (21.29%)
23.8
(14.37%)

*** p < .001
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Difference
35 (18.52%)
6 (3.23%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
12 (7.54%)
9 (5.29%)
22 (13.26%)
19 (12.02%)
22 (14.28%)
4.8
(3.38%)***

Total
hospitals
unranked
by U.S.
News
5,521
5,542
5,570
5,699
5,980
6,016
6,002
6,115
6,082
6,100
6,121
5,886

Table 11: Populations served by U.S. News ranked and unranked hospitals, 20082011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances

Population
Percent insured
Median income
Poverty rate
N
*** p < .001

Ranked by U.S.
News
1,555,894 people
83.8716%
$52,808.55
14.6357%
591

Unranked by U.S.
News
583,939 people
82.3931%
$47,331.72
14.2318%
23,864

Difference (tvalue)
-12.2291***
-5.5948***
-11.0417***
-2.1021

The trend in Table 11—that ranked hospitals are more likely to be found in urban
areas, with large populations and higher than average poverty rates—holds up when we
discover that, between the years of 2008 and 2011, of those hospitals located in the 100
largest cities in the U.S., 418 are U.S. News-ranked and 4,137 are U.S. News-unranked. Being
ranked by U.S. News was significantly correlated with being in a top-100 city (r = .2070, p <
.001).
Table 12: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and unranked
hospitals, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances

Full-time
equivalents
Sole community
provider
Adjusted average
daily census
Number of beds
N

Ranked by U.S.
News

Unranked by U.S.
News

4,627 FTE

746 FTE

441 hospitals

18,288 hospitals

692.2685 patients
551.7496 beds
607

164.9223 patients
144.0916 beds
23,864

t-value
27.0116***
16.8459***
30.0385***

*** p < .001
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29.0052***

Table 12 shows that U.S. News-ranked hospitals have significantly more full-time
equivalents, are significantly less likely to be the sole community provider, and have
significantly more patients and beds.
Table 13: Hospital Compare and U.S. News Best Hospitals, 2011: Results of twosample t-test with unequal variances
Total hospitals in
the U.S. in 2011
Hospitals that
perform well on
both lists
Hospitals ranked
(by U.S. News) or
“better than
national average”
(MHC)

4,655 hospitals
36 hospitals (0.77% of total hospitals; 33.33% of those
ranked by U.S. News; 7.23% of those rated as “better than
national average” by MHC)
606 hospitals (13.02% of total hospitals)

U.S. News
108 hospitals (2.32% of total
hospitals)

Medicare
Hospital
Compare
(MHC)
498 hospitals
(10.70% of total
hospitals)

Table 13 shows that perceived quality is not the same as actual quality, where U.S.
News is perceived quality and actual quality is Medicare Hospital Compare. The U.S. News
ranked hospitals also have higher daily censuses for patients coming through, and are
presumably dealing with more complicated cases, which could hurt their mortality and
readmission scores. Here are the 36 hospitals that were exceptional according to both lists.
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Table 14: Ranked by U.S. News, better than national average for Hospital Compare
1
2
3
4
5
6

Abbott Northwestern Hospital
Barnes-Jewish Hospital
Baylor University Medical Center
Beaumont Hospital
Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center
Brigham and Women’s Hospital

7

Carolinas Medical Center

8

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center

9

Cleveland Clinic

10

Cleveland Clinic Florida

11

Emory University Hospital

12

Florida Hospital Orlando

13

Froedtert Hospital

14

Hackensack University Medical Center

15

Harper University Hospital

16

Henry Ford Hospital

17

Loyola University Medical Center

18

Massachusetts General Hospital

19

Mayo Clinic Hospital

20

Memorial Hermann-Texas Medical Center

21

Methodist Hospital

22

Montefiore Medical Center

23

Mount Sinai Medical Center

24

New York-Presbyterian Hospital

25

Northwestern Memorial Hospital

26

NYU Langone Medical Center

27

Ohio State University Hospital

28

Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center

29

Rush University Medical Center

30

Scripps La Jolla Hospitals and Clinics

31

Shands Hospital at the University of Florida

32

Thomas Jefferson University Hospital

33

University of Miami, Jackson Memorial Hospital

34

University of Michigan Hospitals and Health Centers

35

Washington Hospital Center

36

Yale-New Haven Hospital
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5.2.2 Survey: quality transparency
The U.S. News Best Hospitals provides a high-level overview of the
interaction between hospital quality and other factors in the U.S. I now present the
quality aspect of the survey results. I describe briefly the ways in which the quality
portion of the survey differed from the price portion, and then present the results.

Figure 23: Summary of surveys 1(a), 1(b), 2(a), and 2(b) for quality
transparency

University of Kansas Hospital
Via Christi Hospital

Hospitals shown

Internet source of quality
information

Information presentation

Medicare Hospital
Compare

Survey 1(a)
Screenshots
of website

Survey 2(a)
Tables

U.S. News Best
Hospitals

Survey 1(a)
Screenshots
of website

Survey 2(a)
Tables

As shown in Figure 23, the quality surveys used two hospital quality websites:
Medicare Hospital Compare and U.S. News Best Hospitals. 224 respondents were
surveyed total. Survey 1 had 108 respondents total, while Survey 2 had 102
respondents total. The results of Survey 1 showed that everyday consumers have
difficulty making better healthcare decisions based on currently available information
as it is presented to the public. Survey 2 quantified the impact of the metrics chosen
to present healthcare pricing information.
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The first survey consisted of versions 1(a) and 1(b) to allow comparison of
consumer decisions when presented with different websites providing information
on the same hospitals. One of the websites searched was U.S. News Best Hospitals, a
private ranking initiative. The other website searched was Medicare Hospital
Compare, which is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Including screenshots of websites was intended to simulate the process by which
consumers would access information on their own when preparing to make a real life
healthcare decision.
Beyond conveying the price information itself, the use of screenshots
retained the visual presentation of information of each website and the amount of
information presented. Respondents were provided with some background
information on the website, as demonstrated in Figure 5. For example, as shown in
Figure 5, Survey 1(a) described Hospital Compare as a website run by the federal
government that provides information on healthcare quality.
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Figure 24: Excerpt from Survey 1(a): Quality information from Hospital
Compare (screenshot)

Quality transparency survey: Do respondents choose the higher quality
option?
In Survey 1(a), 55 respondents were presented with quality information on
University of Kansas Hospital and Via Christi Hospital. They were shown quality
information from Hospital Compare, the federal website. The higher quality choice
was University of Kansas. Respondents were asked to assume that the hospitals were
of equal cost.
In response to Survey 1(a), a majority of respondents selected the better
choice, University of Kansas Hospital (38 respondents, constituting 69.09% of the
sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(a) to determine
whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents
choosing the cheapest hospital was determined to be statistically significant at a
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confidence level of 99.99% (t = 3.0371, p = 0.0036). More people selected University
of Kansas than the null hypothesis of an even distribution could accommodate.
In Survey 1(b), 53 respondents were presented with quality information on
University of Kansas Hospital and Via Christi Hospital through U.S. News Best
Hospital rankings. The better choice was very clear. University of Kansas outranked
Via Christi on every count. In response to Survey 1(b), a majority of respondents
selected University of Kansas Hospital (43 respondents, constituting 81% of the
sample).
In response to Survey 1(b), a majority of respondents selected the higherquality choice, University of Kansas Hospital (43 respondents, constituting 81.13%
of the sample). A single sample two-tailed t-test was performed on Survey 1(b) to
determine whether this figure was statistically significant. The percentage of
respondents choosing the higher quality hospital was determined to be statistically
significant at a confidence level of 99.99% (t = 5.7319, p < 0.00001). More people
selected University of Kansas than the null hypothesis of an even distribution could
accommodate.
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Figure 25: Excerpt from Survey 1(b): Quality information from U.S. News
Best Hospitals (screenshot)

Analysis of the survey results focused on whether respondents selected the
hospital with the highest quality, when choosing based on quality. Secondary analysis
focused on whether propensity to make the best decision was predicted by any
particular factors, as collected by demographic and other informational questions in
survey.
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Table 15: Surveys 1(a) and 1(b) for quality: Results of two-tailed Student t-test
1(a)
38 (69%)

1(b)
43 (81%)

Higher quality
choice
N
55
53
†
Not significant at the 0.05 probability level

Difference
5 (12%)†

As Table 19 shows, materials in Survey 1(b) were better than those in Survey
1(a) at leading consumers to make the optimal choice, but not significantly so (t = 1.444, p = .1518).
Now let us move on to Survey 2. In Survey 2(a), 52 respondents were
presented with quality information on University of Kansas Hospital (Hospital A)
and Via Christi Hospital (Hospital B). They were shown quality information
extracted from Hospital Compare, but presented in table format. The better choice
was Via Christi Hospital, because it was shown to be higher quality than the
University of Kansas Hospital for the metrics presented. Respondents were asked to
assume that the hospitals were of equal cost.
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Figure 26:: Excerpt from Survey 2(a): Quality information from Hospital
Compare (extracted)

In response to Survey 2(a), a majority of respondents selected Hospital B
(Via Christi Hospital; 33 respondents, constituting 63% of the sample). A single
sample two-tailed t-test
test was perf
performed on Survey 2(a)) to determine whether this
figure was statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the
cheapest hospital was determined to be statistically significant at a confidence level
of 99.9% (t = 2.0023, p = 0.0506). More people selected the higher quality option
than the null hypothesis of an even distribution could accommodate.
In Survey 2(b), 50 respondents were presented with quality information on
University of Kansas Hospital and Via Christi Hospital extracted from U.S. News
and World Report rankings and presented in table form. The better choice was very
clear. University of Kansas outranked Via Christi on every count
count.
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Figure 27:: Excerpt from Survey 2(b): Quality information from U.S. News
Best Hospitals (extracted)

In response to Survey 2(b), a majority of respondents selected the higher
quality option (48 respondents, constituting 96%
% of the sample). A single sample
two-tailed t-test
test was performed on Survey 2(b
2(b) to determine whether this figure was
statistically significant. The percentage of respondents choosing the cheapest hospital
was determined to be statistically significant at a confidence level of 99.9
99.99%
% (t
( =
16.436, p < 0.00001).). More people selected the higher quality option than the null
hypothesis of an even distribution could accommodate.
Primary analysis
nalysis of the survey results focused on whether respondents
selected the hospital
spital with the highest quality
quality. Secondary analysis focused on whether
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propensity to make the best decision was predicted by any particular factors, as
collected by demographic and other informational questions in survey.
Table 16: Surveys 2(a) and 2(b) for quality: Results of two-tailed Student t-test
Cheapest choice
N
***p < .001

2(a)
33 (63%)
52

2(b)
48 (96%)
50

Difference
15 (33%)***

As we can see in Table 20, the tables presented in Survey 2(b) were
significantly better than those in Survey 2(a) at leading consumers to choose the
better option (t = 4.3941, p = .000028).
Respondents to Survey 2 outperformed respondents to Survey 1, but not by
a statistically significant amount (t = -0.7573; p = 0.4498), as shown in Table 21.
Table 17: Surveys 1 and 2 for quality: Results of two-tailed Student t-test
1(a&b)
81 (75%)

2(a&b)
81 (79%)

Highest quality
choice
N
108
102
†
Not significant at 0.05 probability level

Difference
0 (4%)†

Quality transparency survey: Who was more likely to choose the higher
quality option?
Analysis of the survey results first focused on whether respondents selected
the hospital with the highest quality, when choosing based on quality, and with the
lowest price, when choosing based on price. Secondary analysis focused on whether
propensity to make the better decision was predicted by any particular factors, as
collected by demographic and other informational questions in survey. I considered
the same factors I did with price, but now in relation to information about quality. I
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found similar results—none of the characteristics of respondents were significantly
predictive of their responses.
Examining political affiliation across all surveys, one sees that Republicans
were not significantly more likely than those of any other political affiliation to
choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 0.2532; p = 0.5).
Of respondents, 78.43% of Republicans (n = 51) and 76.73% of non-Republicans (n
= 159) selected the higher quality option.
Examining gender across all surveys, one sees that women were no more
likely than men to choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t =
-0.3558; p = 0.5). 76.15% of women (n = 109) and 78.22% of men (n = 101) selected
the higher quality option. (As with the sections on price, one of the respondents to
the surveys identified as “other,” though all were given the option.)
Those with graduate degrees (JD, MBA, MPH, Ph.D., or other) were no
more likely than those without to choose the higher quality option at a confidence
level of 95% (t = -0.478; p = 0.5). Across all of the surveys, 74.47% of those with
graduate degrees (n = 47) and 77.91% of those without graduate degrees (n = 163)
selected the higher quality option.
Those with higher annual household incomes were statistically no more likely
than those without to choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95%
(t = 1.1977; p = 0.5). 82.26% of those with annual household incomes equal to or
greater than $60,000 (n = 62) and 75.00% of those with annual household incomes
less than $60,000 (n = 148) selected the higher quality option.
Those employed in healthcare were not statistically more likely to choose the
higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 0.277; p = 0.3922). Across all
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of the surveys, 80.00% of those employed in healthcare (n = 15) and 76.92% of
those not employed in healthcare (n = 195) selected the higher quality option.
Those with family or friends employed in healthcare were not statistically
more likely to choose the higher quality option at a confidence level of 95% (t = 0.6546; p = 0.5). Across all of the surveys, 75.24% of those with family or close
friends employed in healthcare (n = 105) and 79.05% of those without (n = 105)
selected the higher quality option. (Respondents who declined to answer the
question were counted as not having close friends or family members employed in
healthcare.)

5.3 Chapter conclusion
In the previous section, I presented the results of the surveys as pertain to
quality transparency. In this chapter as a whole, I have analyzed the usefulness of
current information available to consumers. The survey evidence about both price
and quality supports my claim in Chapters 3 and 4 that recent reforms have not gone
far enough to prompt demand-driven improvements in healthcare delivery. First, in
four survey experiments to determine the impact of information on decision-making,
consumers were more likely to choose the lower cost or higher quality option when
relevant information was presented in straightforward ways with a minimized risk of
information overload (n = 224, t = -3.7065, p < 0.0002). Second, hospitals on the
U.S. News Best Hospital list between 2008 and 2011 were shown to be significantly
more likely to be found in wealthy, highly populated areas, while unranked hospitals
were more likely to be the sole community provider. Third, perceived quality (U.S.
News-ranked hospitals) was shown to be out of alignment with actual quality
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(hospitals performing above the national average for readmission and mortality
according to Medicare Hospital Compare): 36 hospitals performed well on both lists,
constituting only 0.77% of total hospitals in the U.S. in 2011. In the next chapter, I
draw together these components of analysis to show that fears held by economists
and private sector participants will likely not be realized in the near future—but
neither will the hopes of policymakers for demand-driven change in the healthcare
system.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
Assumptions about marketplace participants impact the design of healthcare
systems. Chapter 2 argued that patient behavior is best understood through the lens
of bounded rationality. Chapters 3 and 4 presented the current state of affairs for
price and quality transparency in the U.S. hospital market, suggesting that
transparency efforts have been hindered by assumption that consumers behave
according to full economic rationality. Chapter 5 critically analyzed price-paid and
quality information currently available to the public, presenting survey results and
analysis of the U.S. News Best Hospital rankings for the years 2001 through 2014.
It might make sense to combine cost and quality and incentivize value
through capitation and other links of payment to quality. However, given the
information in the following table, hospitals ranked by U.S. News Best Hospitals
have a significantly lower percentage of their net patient revenue paid on a capitated
basis.
Table 18: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and
unranked hospitals with some percentage of net patient revenue paid on
capitated basis, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances

Percentage of net
patient revenue
paid on capitated
basis
N
*** p < .001

Ranked by U.S.
News

Unranked by U.S.
News

4.6667%
81

10.2561%
1,109
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t-value
6.1087***

Furthermore, as Table 19 shows, hospitals ranked by U.S. News Best
Hospitals have fewer patient lives covered under capitation (although not
significantly fewer).
Table 19: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and
unranked hospitals with some number of patient lives covered under a
capitated basis, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal variances
Ranked by U.S.
News

Unranked by U.S.
News

Number of lives
covered under
capitation
45,971 lives
54,808 lives
N
81
924
†
Not significant at the 0.05 probability level

t-value
0.3739†

Finally, in Table 20, we see that U.S. News-ranked hospitals have a lower
percentage of net patient revenue paid on a shared risk basis (although not
significantly so).
Table 20: Hospital information from AHA for U.S. News ranked and
unranked hospitals with some percentage of net patient revenue paid on
shared risk basis, 2008-2011: Results of two-sample t-test with unequal
variances

Percentage of net
patient revenue
paid on shared risk
basis

Ranked by U.S.
News

Unranked by U.S.
News

10.6667%

17.4580%

t-value
1.2322†

N
63
845
†
Not significant at the 0.05 probability level
Despite this cautionary evidence, linking prices to quality does have promise,
although it runs the risk of stifling the private sector. We are seeking to achieve some
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just allocation of resources, by using the best parts respectively of the political
process and market dynamics.
This thesis presented the case for transparency as a demand-side and supplyside solution to the problems of high costs and low quality in the U.S. healthcare
market. It highlighted the main risks of transparency, including the threat of
collusion leading to higher prices across the board. Ethically and economically, our
policies must seek to maximize quality and minimize cost across the board, while
balancing feasibility considerations. Moving forward politically, we ought to continue
building consensus on these issues, since they are serving as a point of reasonable
bipartisan and stakeholder compromise.
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Appendix
A.1 States with price transparency websites: state-mandated and voluntary
As of 2013, 34 states require some type of price transparency disclosures to the
public, and more are in the works (Coluni, 2012). Yet, these laws are inconsistent
among states. This table shows state-mandated and voluntary websites (Delbanco,
2014).
State with price
transparency websites
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee

State-mandated
website

Voluntary
website

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
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Texas
Utah
Virginia
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
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A.2 Maryland Hospital Association quality measures

Heart attack
Heart failure
Pneumonia
Surgical infection
prevention
Surgical care
Patient satisfaction
Children’s asthma
Medical imaging
Emergency
department care
Preventative care
Healthcare
associated infections
Stroke care
Blood clot
prevention
30-day outcomes

2007
X
X
X

2013
X
X
X

2014
X
X
X

Percentage of
years present
100%
100%
100%

X
X
X
X

33%
66%
66%
66%
33%

X
X

33%
33%

X
X

33%
33%

X
X

33%
33%

X
X
X
X

Note: All information to create this table was gathered by using Internet Archive
Wayback Machine to peruse older versions of the Maryland Hospital Association
quality measures website. The versions used were archived on: June 29, 2007;
February 14, 2013; and November 19, 2014.
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A.3 WCHQ quality measures

Physician/
medical group
Hospital
Health plan
Provider type Clinic
Safety
Institute of
Timeliness
Medicine
Effectiveness
categories
Patientand
improvement centeredness
aims
Efficiency
Access
Critical care
Diabetes
Health
information
technology
Heart care
Patient
satisfaction
Pneumonia
Surgery
Women’s
health
Hypertension
Patient
experience
Clinical topic Cardiac

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
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X

X
X
X

Percentage
of years
present
100%
100%
89%
44%
66%
66%
78%

X

78%
78%
66%
66%
100%

X

X

66%
100%

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

100%
11%

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

44%
44%

X

X

X

66%
100%
89%

Ambulatory
Care
Measures
WCHQ
population
results
WCHQ
measures
summary
Resource use
measures:
hospital
efficiency

surgery
Cardiovascular
specialty care
Chronic care
Episodic care
Preventative
care

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

22%
89%
56%

X

89%
56%

X

X

22%

X

X

22%

Note: All information to create this table was gathered by using Internet Archive Wayback Machine to peruse older versions
of the WCHQ website (web address: wchq.org/reporting). The versions used were archived on: April 12, 2005; February 2,
2006; June 23, 2007; July 9, 2008; November 3, 2009; June 13, 2010; April 10, 2011; July 23, 2012; September 8, 2013; and
November 19, 2014.
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A.4 New Hampshire HealthCost price measures
The New Hampshire Insurance Department released HealthCost version 2 on
February 28, 2007, using a substantially different methodology and presentation than
pilot version 1 (NHID, 2009). Data were not available in the NHCHIS for dates
prior to January 1, 2005. October 1 is the beginning of the fiscal year for many NH
hospitals, so this is when price changes take place. As of 2009, the procedures
included for each year in HealthCost were as follows:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Destruction of lesion
Arthrocentesis
Arthroscopic knee surgery
Tonsillectomy with adenoidectomy
Colonoscopy
Hernia repair
MRIs: Brain, back, pelvis, knee
X-rays: Chest, spine, shoulder, wrist, knee, ankle, foot
CT scans: Chest, pelvis, abdomen
Bone density scan
Mammogram
Ultrasound: Breast, pregnancy, pelvic
Myocardial imaging
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A.5 Medicare Severity Diagnostic Related Group (MS-DRG): Examples for FY 2014
LIST OF MEDICARE SEVERITY DIAGNOSIS-RELATED GROUPS (MS-DRGS), RELATIVE
WEIGHTING FACTORS, AND GEOMETRIC AND ARITHMETIC MEAN LENGTH OF STAY—FY 2014
Final Rule
FY
2014
FY 2014
FR
FR
MS- PostSpecial
Geometri Arithmeti
DR
Acute
Pay
TYP
c mean
c mean
G
DRG
DRG
MDC E
MS-DRG Title
Weights LOS
LOS
HEART TRANSPLANT OR
SUR
IMPLANT OF HEART ASSIST
001
No
No
PRE
G
SYSTEM W MCC
25.3518 28.3
35.9
HEART TRANSPLANT OR
SUR
IMPLANT OF HEART ASSIST
002
No
No
PRE
G
SYSTEM W/O MCC
15.2738 15.9
18.6
ECMO OR TRACH W MV 96+
SUR
HRS OR PDX EXC FACE,
003
Yes
No
PRE
G
MOUTH & NECK W MAJ O.R.
17.6369 27.2
33.2
TRACH W MV 96+ HRS OR
SUR
PDX EXC FACE, MOUTH &
004
Yes
No
PRE
G
NECK W/O MAJ O.R.
10.9288 20.3
24.7
LIVER TRANSPLANT W MCC
SUR
OR INTESTINAL
005
No
No
PRE
G
TRANSPLANT
10.4214 15.1
20.1
SUR
LIVER TRANSPLANT W/O
006
No
No
PRE
G
MCC
4.7639
7.9
9.0
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This table represents just the first six rows of the FY 2014 Final Rule Table 5 released by CMS, which continues through
MS-DRG 999. The table lists MS-DRGs, relative weighting factors, and geometric and arithmetic mean length of stay
(CMS, 2013a).
A.6 Medicare Severity Diagnostic Related Group (MS-DRG) Reimbursement Rates: Example

The table shows final FY2014 MS-DRG national average payment rates for select cardiovascular procedures and the
percent change as compared to FY2013 MS-DRG final national average rates. The rates and percent changes shown are
base payments. Actual rates may vary for individual hospitals due to geographic wage differences (Scientific, 2013).
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A.7 Hospital Chargemaster: Example

1

CDM
49000025
00
72000100
10
72007200
15
12500214
36001050
00
12714348
27831755
00

Description
HB PROCEDURE ROOM
HOURS 0.25
HB LABOR ROOM TIME
PER 1 HOUR
HB LABOR ROOM TIME
EA ADD 15MIN
HB TISSUE
DECALCIFICATION
HB OR HOURS 10.50
HB USTEKINUMAB
SYRINGE 90MG
USTE90SYR

Standard
Charge

Surgery
Center/Proced
ure Room
Charge

1,530.00

370.00

392.00

280.00

98.00

70.00

L&D
Charge

Pharm
Charge
Per
Dose

Pharm
Supply
Charge
Range

60.00
20,882.
00

26,364.00

32,801.
22
999 3296.7

HB CATH INTRASPINAL

The table shows a sample of chargemaster entries from Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center in 2014, acquired from the
State of California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD, 2015).
1
CDM stands for “charge description master,” which is often shortened to “chargemaster.” In the CDM column are the
codes specific to different procedures in Ronald Reagan UCLA Medical Center’s chargemaster.
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A.8 Practice guideline: Example
What follows is an excerpt from the American Psychiatric Association’s Practice
Guideline for the treatment of patients with bipolar disorder, to provide an example
of a practice guideline (Association, 2010).
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A.9 Survey 2(a): Full
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139

140

141

142

143
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A.10 Evidence of Mount Sinai Health System getting out the vote for U.S.
News rankings (emails)
From: Broadcast Communications
Sent: Monday, February 10, 2014 11:16 AM
Subject: Alert from the Dean’s Office Regarding Paper Ballots for U.S. News &
World Report Reputation Surveys
TO:
FROM:

Faculty, Staff, and Students
Kenneth L. Davis, MD
Chief Executive Officer and President
Mount Sinai Health System
Dennis S. Charney, MD, Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Dean
Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai
President for Academic Affairs, Mount Sinai Health System

DATE:

February 10, 2014

RE: Alert from the Dean’s Office Regarding Paper Ballots for U.S. News &
World Report Reputation Surveys
U.S. News & World Report recently mailed paper ballots for its annual “Best
Hospitals” and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” surveys to physicians around the
country. The paper ballots are tabulated to determine reputational scores for U.S.
News rankings.
If you have received a paper ballot pertaining to the Best Hospitals or Best Pediatric
Hospitals rankings, please notify the office of Dennis S. Charney, MD, Anne and
Joel Ehrenkranz Dean of the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai. We want to
be sure that all physicians who received these ballots fill them out.
The ballots for the Best Hospitals survey were sent by first-class mail to a random
selection of 200 board certified specialists across the United States in each of the 16
specialties that are ranked. The ballots for the Pediatric survey were mailed to 150
specialists in each of the 10 pediatric fields that are ranked.
Between January 2 and 31, U.S. News emailed the intended recipients of the paper
ballots to let them know they would be receiving them. The email appeared with the
subject line: “Nominations for U.S. News Best Hospitals Rankings.”
Please check your mail carefully to see if you have received a ballot, or search your
Mount Sinai, MSSM, or other personal and professional email accounts for the
subject line of “Nominations for U.S. News Best Hospital Rankings,” to see if you
were notified. You can also search by the sender’s address which
wasBestHospitals@rti.org or MedIntel@hcpconnects.com.
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The ballot asks you to list up to five U.S. hospitals that provide the best inpatient
care for challenging medical or surgical conditions in your specialty. U.S. News uses
the ballots to derive the reputational index for its rankings methodology. Other
factors include Structure, Process, and Outcomes. The factors are weighted
differently across specialty areas.
For the first time this year, U.S. News has partnered with Doximity.com to conduct
an online reputational survey that is being used in conjunction with the paper ballots
for the “Best Hospitals” overall reputational rankings index. The Doximity survey is
not being used for the “Best Pediatrics Hospitals” rankings this year.
The ballot period will close in mid-April. The rankings for “Best Pediatric Hospitals”
will be published in mid-June, and “Best Hospitals” will be published in mid-July.
We appreciate your assistance in ensuring that the Mount Sinai Health System is fully
represented in the nomination process.
From: Broadcast Communications
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2015 2:54 PM
Subject: U.S. News & World Report Opens Online Voting for the “Best Hospitals”
and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” Rankings
TO:

All Faculty and Staff

FROM:

Kenneth L. Davis, MD
Chief Executive Officer and President
Mount Sinai Health System
Dennis S. Charney, MD
Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Dean
Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai
President for Academic Affairs
Mount Sinai Health System

DATE:

February 13, 2015

RE:
U.S. News & World Report Opens Online Voting for the “Best
Hospitals” and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” Rankings
Online voting is now open via Doximity.com for the 2015 U.S. News & World
Report “Best Hospitals” and “Best Pediatric Hospitals” rankings. Sixteen clinical
specialties and ten pediatric specialties will be ranked in 2015/16.
All eligible adult and pediatric physicians who activated their Doximity account in
December, 2014, will have the opportunity to vote within their board-certified
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specialty. Eligible physicians can log on to Doximity.com at any time to take the
survey. Additionally, Doximity will be sending eligible physicians an invitation to take
the survey with reminder invitations to follow over the next few weeks, from either a
.doximity.com or .doximity.org server. We encourage you to vote before the
February 27 deadline, and support the increased rankings of individual Mount Sinai
hospitals. Results will be published in July, 2015.
U.S. News & World Report made a significant change to its reputation-scoring
methodology last year by teaming with Doximity to collect online votes for adult
specialties. Last year, slightly more than 8,000 online votes by Doximity members
were included in the calculation for adult hospital rankings. This was combined with
the 3,200 printed surveys mailed to board-certified physicians.
For pediatrics, 1,500 printed ballots were mailed out, but an online Doximity survey
was not available at that time. The addition of online voting for pediatrics in 2015 is
surely a great benefit that will add validity to the reputation scorings.
Doximity.com is a free, online professional network for U.S. physicians. Of the
network’s more than 300,000 members, at least 200,000 currently meet the criteria to
vote online in the U.S. News rankings. All Doximity votes will count toward the U.S.
News reputation score, adjusted for accurate representation among hospitals
nationwide.
In prior years, survey-eligible physicians were identified through the American
Medical Association Masterfile. This year, U.S. News will be employing the Doximity
Masterfile, which includes every physician who appears in the U.S. NewsDoctor
Finder.
In the unlikely instance that you receive a printed ballot in the mail after you have
already voted online, please make sure to fill it out and submit the printed ballot as
well.
If you did not activate your Doximity account by December 5, 2014, you should still
register on Doximity.com so you are eligible to vote next year.
Thank you for your continued commitment to advancing both the outstanding
patient care of the Mount Sinai Health System, and the innovative education
provided by the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.
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